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ABSTRACT
LABOR MARKET SEGMENTATION IN 
NEW ENGLAND: EMPIRICAL AND CASE STUDIES
by
ROBERT NEIL HORN
This dissertation focuses on factors which may contribute to labor 
market segmentation in New England. Segmentation or dual labor market 
theorists divide the labor market into primary and secondary sectors, 
claiming the nature of occupations within the separate markets differs 
with respect to the organization of work, remuneration, locus of control 
and room for promotional opportunity. Employment conditions in the 
secondary labor market are characterized by low pay, high turnover, 
minimal skill requirements, arbitrary managerial control and little or 
no room for in-firm upward mobility. Primary labor market occupations, 
on the other hand, are characterized by higher pay, greater employment 
stability and the existence of internal labor markets. Central to the 
dualists' interpretation of the labor market is the hypothesis that the 
sector in which a worker begins employment is the sector in which he will 
remain throughout his entire working career.
The above hypotheses are tested in two ways. First, using data from 
the 1970 Census Public Use Sample, I have constructed a set of econometric 
models which analyze (a) the process of wage determination in the primary 
and secondary labor market, (b) the conditional probability of primary 
market employment, and (c) the likelihood of upward (secondary to primary)
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mobility. The empirical results of each of the models are interpreted 
in terms of their consistency with the basic postulates of dual labor 
market theory as well as neoclassical human capital theory.
The second part of the thesis consists of a case study of the 
structure of the labor market in Manchester, New Hampshire, the state’s 
largest and most industrious city. By means of open ended interviews 
with white collar and blue collar workers and managerial personnel, the 
existence of labor market duality in Manchester is directly examined. 
Employee and management responses are also used to determine the struc­
ture of internal labor markets which, according to dual theory, provide 
institutionally determined avenues of upward mobility, seniority clauses 
and pay scales for workers in primary occupations. By combining econo­
metric models with a case study, this dissertation provides a clearer 
description of the functioning of labor markets than most of the earlier 
research, which has tended to rely exclusively on empirical model 
building.
The dissertation also includes an extensive review of the recent 
literature on labor market segmentation. Particular emphasis is placed 
on employment conditions in secondary markets and the contributions of 
radical economists to the study of labor markets. In a separate chapter 




In recent years, economists have shown Increasing concern over the 
plight of large numbers of the labor force who appear to be confined to 
low wage labor markets. The apparent failure of government manpower 
programs to reduce the burdens of economic inequality in the labor mar­
ket has prompted some economists to advocate policies aimed directly at 
the structure of labor markets. This represents a marked change from 
traditional analysis, which stresses increasing education and vocational 
training programs, i.e., supply side factors, as the means by which dis­
advantaged workers would be able to gain access to better paying jobs. 
Advocates of this change in public policy argue that workers in low 
wage labor markets do have the ability to perform in higher wage sectors, 
but market imperfections, discrimination, and other institutional con­
straints function as barriers, severely limiting their access to the 
better jobs. Policies suggested to alleviate the burdens of disadvan­
taged workers include stronger emphasis on antidiscriminatory legisla­
tion to curb racial imbalance in primary labor markets, programs to 
stabilize secondary market employment relations, making them more 
primary-like, and increased use of federal government employment 
creating programs.
In this dissertation, I examine some factors which may contribute 
to, or result from, the segmentation of labor markets. The thesis is 
divided into three main sections. In Chapters II and III, I present a 
detailed review of the conceptual literature on the segmentation of
labor markets, and several empirical attempts to determine the existence 
of labor market duality. The literature review begins with a brief 
discussion of the history of the theory of non-competing groups (John S. 
Mill and J. Cairnes) and progresses to the work of the institutionalists 
during the 1950's and the studies of ghetto labor markets during the 
early 1960's, out of which dual theory developed. I then turn my atten­
tion to a thorough discussion of employment conditions and industrial 
organization in secondary and primary labor markets. The chapter con­
cludes with a summary of radical contributions to labor market theory 
and public policy implications derived from a dualist approach to labor 
markets.
In the Empirical Studies Review Chapter, I look at four researchers' 
attempts to devise econometric models to depict the incidence of seg­
mented labor markets. Special attention is given to the methods used 
to determine which jobs are classified as primary or secondary. The 
models are divided into three sections: (1) wage determination,
(2) probability of primary market employment, and (3) likelihood of 
secondary to primary mobility. Within each section, the results of the 
models are analyzed and criticized in terms of their specification and 
consistency with the basic postulates of dual labor market theory.
The second section of the thesis consists of the development of 
a set of linear regression models to determine the extent of segmenta­
tion in New England labor markets. In Chapter IV, three empirical 
models, corresponding to the sections cited in the previous paragraph, 
are specified. Each of the variables appearing in the equations is 
discussed in terms of its expected sign and significance according to 
dual market theory.
In Chapter V, I present the results of testing the models developed
3in Chapter IV using a data base consisting of the 1970 Census Public 
Use Sample for the five New England states. The regression coefficients 
are carefully scrutinized in order to determine the efficacy of the 
dualist approach to the study of labor markets. The results are also 
used to compare the dual approach with the paradigm still adhered to by 
most mainstream economists: the queue theory.
The third part of the thesis consists of a case study of labor 
market conditions in Manchester, New Hampshire. By means of interviews 
with production level workers and managerial personnel in several of the 
city's largest footwear, textile, and electronics industries, I try to 
determine whether or not labor market segmentation is suggested by the 
operation of the labor market from which these industries draw their 
manpower needs, and the relations of production within the firms. I also 
document the extent to which internal labor markets serve to institu­
tionalize job progression mechanisms in each of the plants visited.
Although the case study approach has not been as widely used in 
economics as in the other social sciences, I argue that it is a viable 
way to acquire detailed information about local industrial and labor 
market characteristics. In fact, my conclusions suggest that advocates 
of dual market theory should place increasing emphasis on case studies 
of local labor markets, so as to develop a data base comprehensive 
enough to take account of both supply side and demand side conditions in 
future empirical studies.
CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Dual labor market theory had what might be called its preorigins
in the writings of several economists of the classical school. John S.
Mill recognized that the range of occupations available to a worker
depended upon the socio-economic status of his father. Mill wrote:
The liberal professions are mostly supplied by the 
sons of either the professional or the idle classes: 
the more highly skilled manual employments are filled 
up from the sons of skilled artisans, or the class 
of tradesmen who rank with them: the lower classes
of employment are in a similar case: and unskilled
labourers, with few exceptions, rjmain from father to 
son in their prestine condition.
Although Mill acknowledged the remote possibility of interclass mobility,
he stated that there is a "hereditary distinction of caste" between
different grades of labor, and criticized earlier political economists
2
for failing to take account of such distinctions.
The strongest statements concerning occupational stratification
among the working classes can be found in the writings of J.E. Cairnes.
Cairnes, after undertaking an extensive study of the process by which
workers find employment, concluded that
What we find...is not a whole population competing 
indiscriminately for all occupations, but a series 
of industrial layers...within each of which the 
various candidates for employment possess...power
'''John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, edited by 
Sir W. J. Ashley (New York: Augustus M. Kelly, Bookseller, 1871), p.393.
2
M. Blaug, Economic Theory in Retrospect, (Illinois: Richard C.
Irwin, Inc. 1962), p.176.
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5of selection while those occupying the several strata 
are, for all purposes of effective competition, 
practically isolated from each other.^
Cairnes was also credited with developing the theory of noncompeting
groups, as the following much quoted passage illustrates:
...the average workman, from whatever rank he be taken, 
finds his power of competition limited to a certain 
range of occupations...We are thus compelled to recog­
nize the existence of noncompeting industrial groups 
as a feature of our social economy.^
With the rise of marginalism in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century, and its concommitant shift away from the study of social 
classes towards individual maximizing behavior, the theory of noncom­
peting groups was cast aside.It was not until the middle of the pre­
sent century that the theory was revitalized by the institutionalist 
school, spearheaded by Clark Kerr’s work on institutional and structure­
less labor markets.
Kerr described the dimensions of institutional markets as being 
set by formal and informal rules, not by the individual preferences of 
employers and employees as competitive theory would dictate. Accor­
ding to Kerr:
institutional rules in the labor market...establish 
boundaries between labor markets and make them more 
specific and harder to cross. They define the 
points of competition, the groups which may compete, 
and the grounds on which they compete.^
3




S^ee M. Dobb Theories of Value and Distribution ch.7, for a discus­
sion of the change in the subject matter of economists during the
Marginal Revolution.
£
Clark Kerr, "The Balkanization of Labor Markets" in Labor Mobility 
and Economic Opportunity, ed. E. Wright Bakke, et.al. (New York: Tech­
nology Press of M.I.T. and John Wiley 1954), p.93.
7Ibid. p.109.
6This internally structured type of labor market is contrasted with 
what Kerr and Lloyd Fisher labeled the "structureless market". The 
latter is said to possess the following characteristics:
(1) No unions with seniority or other rules,
(2) the relation between the employee and employer is 
a transitory, impersonal one,
(3) the workers are unskilled,
(4) payment is by unit of product, and
(5) little or no machinery is employed.®
I will show that the distinction between institutional and structureless 
labor markets formed the basis for the dualist dichotomization of the 
labor market into primary and secondary sectors. Kerr's description 
of the mechanisms which govern entry criteria, mobility patterns, wage 
determination and the role of unions in institutional markets versus 
the "cash nexus" nature of structureless markets provided an important 
framework for future labor market analysis. That the dualists have 
adopted this framework is apparent, as there is direct lineage from the 
institutional market to the primary labor market and from the structure­
less market to the secondary labor market. What is missing in Kerr's 
work is a discussion of socioeconomic factors which result in confine­
ment within structureless markets. Some dualists and, more recently, 
radical economists have tried to address this issue.
One final comment on what I have labeled "preorigins" of dual . 
labor market analysis concerns the awareness of the institutionalists 
that the changing structure of American industry has fostered the 
development of internalized job clusters. Glen Cain pointed out
Dunlop and Kerr view(ed) the growth of large firms
and unions as promoting internal (within-firm) labor
8Ibid. p.95.
7markets that are only weakly connected to external 
(between-firm) labor markets,^
while E. R. Livernash stated, "internal promotion has developed with the
growing diversification and specialization of jobs."^ Radicals,
picking up where the institutionalists left off, have made the dynamics
of the monopolization of capital and its affects on labor markets a
focal point of much of their work in this area.
The Development of Dual Labor Market Analysis
Dual labor theory did not emerge as a continuum in the theoretical
progression of labor market analysis cited above. According to David
M. Gordon, "dual labor market theory arose out of a series of relatively
informal studies of local labor markets and individual establishments."^
The "informal" nature of these early studies has led some writers to
argue that dual theory "is not really a theory but merely a descriptive
12view of the labor market." Nevertheless, a substantial body of 
literature has developed in recent years, the immediate origins of which 
can be traced to several independent studies of labor market conditions 
in inner city areas of New York, Boston and Chicago during the 1960's.
Thus, Michael J. Piore, who along with Peter Doeringer has been the 
chief proponent of dual market analysis, describes its intent as
9
Glen G. Cain, "the Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to 
Orthodox Theory: A Survey", Journal of Economic Literature, (Vd. XIV,
No. 4,Dec. 1976, pp.1215-1257), p.1222.
^E. Robert Livernash, "The Internal Wage System" in New Concepts in 
Wage Determination, (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1957, pp.140-172), 
p.144.
1;LDavid M. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment, (Lexington, 
Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972), p. 43.
12Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Conse­
quences", (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1975),
p.10.
follows:
...dual hypothesis was designed to explain the 
problems of disadvantaged, particularly black, 
workers in urban areas, which had previously been 
attributed to unemployment. It implied that the 
basic problem was that they were somehow confined 
to jobs within the secondary sector, and the 
reported unemployment rates were essentially a 
symptom of the instability of the jobs and the 
high rate of labor turnover among the labor force 
which held them rather than a literal inability 
to find work.
The basic postulate of dual or segmented labor market theory is 
that there is no single labor market from which employers seek workers 
in accordance with the latter's marginal productivity. Dualists 
divide or segment the labor market into two or more distinct labor 
markets, claiming the characteristics of the separate markets differ 
with respect to the organization of work, remuneration, locus of 
control, labor supply, and so forth. The major distinction found in 
the literature is between the secondary labor market and the primary 
labor market.
I begin the body of this literature review by giving a detailed 
discussion of the secondary labor market, paying close attention to 
the relations of production in this sector. I then discuss the pri­
mary labor market and its institutionalized internal structure. A 
discussion of an operational framework for the study of market duality 
and its implications for public policy follows. The chapter concludes 
with radical interpretations and extensions of market segmentation 
theory.
13Michael J. Piore, "Notes for a Theory of Labor Market Segmentation" 
in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et. al. (Lexington, 
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company 1975), p.126.
9The Secondary Labor Market
Secondary labor market jobs are characterized by low pay, unstable
employment and poor working conditions, and are said to be in direct
competition with welfare and crime for the attachment of the potential 
14labor force. Although the latter part of the preceding statement 
may somewhat over estimate the transient nature of the secondary labor 
force, workers confined to this sector do face employment opportunities 
which tend to promote and even encourage instability. Remuneration is 
often by hourly wage and/or piecework; workers are subject to arbitrary 
managerial decision making; and the jobs, once learned, quickly become 
mere routines leaving virtually no room for individual autonomy and 
growth. As a result, there appears to be very little reason why any 
worker should feel any sense of attachment to any particular secondary 
market job.
Piore and Doeringer cite three kinds of employment situations 
commonly found within the secondary labor market. The first of these 
is completely unstructured employment.'*''’ This is closest in context to 
Fisher's structureless labor market cited above. Next is what they call 
"secondary" internal markets, which do have some amount of internal 
structure, but many ports of entry, short mobility clusters and low 
paying, unpleasant work.^ Last are secondary jobs attached to the 
bottom end of an "internal labor market in which the remainder of jobs
14Michael J. Piore, "On-the-Job Training in a Dual Labor Market" in 
Public-Private Manpower Policies, ed. Arnold R. Weber (Madison, Wise.: 
I.R.R.A. pp.101-132, 1969), p.102.
^Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets 
and Manpower Analysis, (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co. 1971),
p.167.
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are primary".They are careful to point out that although "attached" 
to a primary market job sequence, secondary workers do not have access 
to the better paying, higher status jobs hovering just above their heads.
Labor Supply and Industrial Organization
Given Doeringer's and Piore's description of secondary employment
situations, it is important to detail factors which characterize the
supply of labor in secondary labor markets. Harold Wool points out that
the American economy has had little trouble in meeting its low level 
18manpower needs. He goes on to note:
Employers experience little difficulty in recruiting 
an adequate supply of workers for (secondary labor 
market) jobs because of the existence of a large pool 
of workers who have few other effective choices.
Included in this pool are disproportionate numbers of 
black workers, recent immigrants, and migrants from 
farm to city, all sharing more or less the handicap 
of limited education, skills and information.^
Karl Marx's concept of the industrial reserve army of the unemployed 
is quite relevant to Wool's depiction of the secondary work force. Marx 
saw that the process of capitalist development created a mass of low 
skilled, undifferentiated labor power, whose numbers swelled the ranks 
of the unemployed. Because of competition for the existing jobs, their 
chief function (to the capitalists) was to depress wages down to sub­
sistence levels and prevent the formation of collective agreements by 
workers which would result in upward pressure on wage rates.
In addition to fitting into the Marxian perspective, the secondary 
labor market also closely approximates the neoclassical model of a
17Ibid.
18Harold Wool, "Future Labor Supply for Lower Level Occupations" in 
Monthly Labor Review, (Vol.99, No. 3, March 1976, pp.22-31), p.26.
19Ibid.
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competitive market. Labor power is taken by employers to be a homo­
geneous commodity, and firms share many of the traits of Marshall's 
representative firm operating under competitive conditions, i.e., small 
in relation to the market, little effective control over price, low 
profit margins etc. Barry Bluestone has done considerable work in 
describing the characteristics of industries which operate in low wage 
sectors of the economy. His research suggests that low wages do not 
result from monopolistic exploitation of labor in order to reap high
20profits, but from low profit margins in the bulk of low wage industries.
He goes on to point out that, "the small 'invisible' firm...often avoids
the sharp eye of the government inspector and the acute sensitivities
of an aroused public opinion. Consequently, low wages and poor working
conditions have a much better change of survival in the industries of 
21the working poor."
Given the structure and the minimal training requirements of jobs
in the secondary sector, employers, in making their hiring decisions, act
22as if employees have more or less equal productivities. Furthermore, 
since the majority of industries operating in this sector are labor 
intensive, and since there are minimal internal and external institu­
tional constraints, low wages tend to reflect the low marginal produc­
tivity of labor. Wage determination is quite simply left up to imper­
sonal market forces. Minimum wage statutes may be considered a constraint, 
although Bluestone notes many low wage groups have been excluded from
20Barry Bluestone, "The Characteristics of Marginal Industries" in 
Problems in Political Economy: An Urban Perspective, (Lexington, Mass.:





Wage rates are uniformly low throughout the entire secondary labor
market. While slight variations in wages may be attributable to market
imperfections, Gordon concludes that:
individual incomes will depend primarily on the 
number of hours worked, while variations in 
individual hourly earnings will depend very little 
on variations in individual "capacities" like 
aptitude, reasoning and vocational skills.^
Bluestone provides an important summary of the implications of this tie
between the process of wage determination in the secondary labor market
and competitive theory in the competitive model. He writes:
It is interesting to note that precisely where the 
market approaches its theoretical best-in firms 
furthest from monopoly and closest to laissez faire- 
the market cannot supply jobs adequate enough to 
feed a man's family satisfactorily.^
Employment Conditions
Doeringer, Piore, and others have argued that employment instability
26is a common feature within the secondary labor market. Turnover rates 
are high largely because neither the employer nor the employee has any 
vested interest in promoting stable employment relationships. From the 
employer's point of view, the short learning curves common to secondary 
jobs and the existence of a large pool of substitute workers renders 
turnover inexpensive and not a cause for concern. From the workers'
23Bluestone. p. 195.
"^ Gordon, p. 51
25Bluestone. p. 107.
26Employment instability is not unique to the secondary market. Also, 
workers may remain on their jobs for long periods of time even though the 
jobs themselves may encourage instability.
27Rosenberg, p. 14.
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perspective, the very nature of the jobs, i.e., low wages, poor working 
conditions, seasonality etc., encourages a high rate of turnover.
It is important to realize that turnover within the secondary 
market is largely confined to "bouncing around" from one low level job 
to another, whereas in primary markets an individual usually leaves his 
job for a better one. Stephan Thernstrom gives an excellent illustra­
tion of the type of "mobility" common to secondary market workers. He 
states:
the clerk who becomes a salesman, the menial hospital 
employee who becomes a short order cook...these are 
men who have not discernably gained (or lost) in the 
process of changing jobs. They may have been drawn 
into the new post by slightly higher wages...or they 
may have been fired...and forced to accept somewhat 
lower wages...in order to find work at all. In 
either case...(one)...would glassify their movement 
as horizontal, not vertical.
Central to the notion of employment instability within the secon­
dary sector is the position held by some dualists that unstable jobs 
lead to unstable lifestyles, which tend to reinforce behavioral patterns
which are antagonistic to stable employment. Doeringer asserts that
29these patterns are passed on to succeeding generations. As a result, 
the conditions which gave rise to secondary labor markets also act to 
insure their reproduction and continued existence. As Glen Cain so 
aptly puts it:
28Stephen Thernstrom, The Other Bostonians: Poverty and Progress
in the American Metropolis 1880-1870, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1973) ,  p.47.
29Peter B. Doeringer and others, Low-Income Labor Markets and Urban 
Manpower Programs: A Critical Assessment, (U. S. Department of Labor,
1972), p.9.
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factors that start workers off in the secondary 
sector can shape tastes in an antiwork direction 
and thereby reinforce the disadvantaged position 
of low wage workers. The (segmentation) model 
has an aspect of the "viscious circle" or "self- 
fulfilling prophecy" to it. 30
This position is given further support by Bennett Harrison who claims
that "by acclimating themselves to local work arrangements, workers find
it psychologically as well as technically difficult to move from one
31stratum of the economy to another."
The Culture of Poverty
This social class reproduction schema bears a close resemblance to 
the socioanthropologlcal studies of Oscar Lewis on what he has labeled 
the culture of poverty. Lewis' criteria for the existence of a culture 
of poverty parallels those offered by segmentation theorists for the 
existence and functioning of secondary labor markets. His relevant 
criteria specify an organization of production characterized by:
(1) A cash economy, wage labor and production for 
profit,
(2) Persistently high rate of unemployment and 
underemployment for unskilled labor,
(3) Low wages,
(4) The existence in the dominant class of a set 
of values that stresses the accumulation of 
wealth and property, the possibility of upward 
mobility...and that explains low economic 
status as the result of personal inadequacy
or inferiority.
Lewis maintains that "the culture of poverty is both an adoption and a
30Cain. p.1223.
31Bennett Harrison, "Additional Thoughts on the Dual Labor Market" 
in Monthly Labor Review, (Vol.95, No.4, April 72, pp.37-39), p.37.
32Oscar Lewis, "The Culture of Poverty" in On Understanding Poverty, 
ed. Daniel P. Moynihan (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1968), pp.187-188.
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reaction of the poor to their marginal position in a class stratified,
33highly individuated, capitalistic society." Descriptions of "street
corner lifestyles" in urban slum areas, such as those given by Elliot
Leibow in Tally's Corner, show that once one is immersed into a culture
of poverty, he is almost certain to remain there, not only for his
34lifetime, but in all likelihood, for his offspring's as well.
The above views on the intergenerational transmission of unstable
life/work patterns are not wholly acceptable to many segmentation
theorists. They tend to make barriers between secondary and primary
labor markets insurpassable. We shall see below that this is not
necessarily so. Even more important is the notion that workers become
psychologically conditioned to their work environment and are not able
to function outside of it. Numerous studies have shown that the "hard
core" unemployed living in urban slum areas can develop stable working
habits, given that the organization which locates in the area provides
35an environment conductive to the development of such traits. Sar
Levitan, commenting on the results of I.B.M.'s decision to locate a 
plant in the Bedford-Stuyvesant section of Brooklyn, New York, noted that 
vandalism, arson, and theft have not been problems, the workers appear 
motivated and responsible and high rates of absenteeism and labor
33Ibid. p. 188.
34For a critique of this approach,see Charles A. Valentine's 
Culture and Poverty. P. J. Andrisani tries to empirically test for the 
existence of the culture of poverty in his Ph.D. thesis, An Empirical 
Analysis of the Dual Labor Market Theory.
35See Peter B. Doeringer, editor Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged, 
for a series of case studies detailing the experiences of several com­
panies which opened plants or set up training schools.in black inner 
city slum areas.
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36turnover have not been encountered. In short, it is not psycholo­
gical conditioning, but a lack of effective opportunities for choice 
which results in secondary entrapment.
The role of secondary labor markets in the larger macroeconomy will 
be discussed after I present the characteristics and functioning of 
primary labor markets. It is to the primary labor market that we now 
turn our attention.
The Primary Labor Market
The primary labor market can be considered the diametric opposite 
of the secondary market. Primary occupations are relatively high pay­
ing, stable, have good working conditions, changes for advancement and
37equitable administration of work rules. Although opportunities for 
advancement exist, the range of occupations which usually lie in the 
primary sector is quite diverse. Some occupations are marked by a sub­
stantial amount of autonomy, i.e., the worker has considerable control 
over his job, while others lack autonomy. This questions of degree of 
autonomy has led some dualists to propose a subdivision of the primary
sector into upper and lower tiers according to the "amount of personal
38participation in the production of the final good or service." 
Nevertheless, primary occupations are considered to embody the basic 
characteristics outlined above.
36Sar A. Levitan, "Discussion of Edward C. Banfield An Act of 
Corporate Citizenship: The I.B.M. Plant in Bedford-Stuyvesant" in
Programs to Employ the Disadvantaged, ed. Peter Doeringer (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1969), p.58.
37Piore, "On-the-Job..." p.102.
38Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation" 
in Industrial and Labor Relations Review (July, 1975)pp.508-523, p.510.
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Entry Conditions
As we shall see, the Internal administration of work rules in this 
sector departs considerably from the traditional neoclassical analysis 
of the operation of competitive markets. Only at ports of entry into 
primary jobs slots do market forces come into play. Here too "non­
economic" tastes and preferences of employers (and unions) act to limit 
entry possibilities. Clark Kerr writes:
the process of selection is also the process of 
rejection. Decisions are made in favor of certain 
individuals but at the same time against others.
The individuals which control these ports of entry 
greatly affect the distribution of opportunities in 
economic society. The rules that they follow deter­
mine how equitably opportunity is spread and the 
characteristics for which men are rewarded and for 
which they are p e n a l i z e d .39
Unlike the secondary market wherein labor power is perceived as a homo­
genous commodity, primary employers are aware of differences among pro­
spective employees, whether they be skin color, sex, or educational 
status.
Primary market employers tend to rely quite heavily on educational 
credentials in making their hiring decisions. By using the high school 
diploma as a prerequisite for employment, employers have a "quick and 
allegedly inexpensive device for screening out...undesirable individuals."^ 
Bennett Harrison points out that the result of this practice is to
"screen out" minority workers who may well be capable of performing the
41requisite job tasks. Since minorities, on the average, tend to have
39Kerr. p.102.
40Bennett Harrison, Education, Training and the Urban Ghetto,
(Baltimore: the John Hopkins Press 1972), p.30.
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less education than white males, credentialism effectively serves to
maintain racial imbalance in primary labor markets.
The work of Bowles and Gintls on the functions of the educational
system under monopoly capitalism transcends the discriminatory aspects
cited above. They argue that the major function of the educational
system is to replicate the existing social relations of production,
thereby ensuring all levels of capital a continuous source of labor 
42power. Of importance to employers is that schools teach future
A 3workers how to behave, i.e., punctuality, submission to authority, etc.
This provides a convenient rationale for educational credentialism by
primary employers, in that screening out those with low levels of
education ensures them a labor force that will show up on time, follow
directions and value material incentives.
The entry process into primary market positions can be looked at in
terms of the queue theory of the labor market. Workers are arrayed along
44a continuum in order of their desirability to employers. Employers,
given their tastes and preferences, choose their workers from as far up
45the queue as possible. According to the human capital school, those 
prospective workers with the largest amounts of human capital investment 
will occupy the top positions along the queue. Employers are thus acting 
quite rationally in selecting those workers who will make the largest
42
See Sam Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America for 
an historical look at the development of educational institutions as 
capitalism moved from its competitive to monopoly stages.
43Samuel Bowles, "Contradictions in United States Higher Education" 
in Modern Political Economy, ed. J. Weaver (Boston: Allyn and Bacon, Inc.
1973), pp.81, 166.
44Lester C. Thurow, Poverty and Discrimination, (Washington, D.C.: 
Brookings Institution 1969), p.48.
45Ibid.
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net contributions to output. Since wage rates are determined by labor’s 
marginal productivity, the income differential between jobs in the 
secondary sector and entry level primary positions can be explained, in 
part, by the former's relatively lower marginal productivity.
The Internal Labor Market
After initial port of entry hiring decisions are made, the internal 
labor market replaces the competitive external market. Doeringer and 
Piore define internal labor markets as "administrative units within
which the pricing and allocation of labor are governed by a set of
46administrative rules and procedures." Once in an internal labor 
market, the worker is largely protected from external forces. Pay 
increases, promotions, seniority, dismissal and job grading are not 
subject to market forces, but are determined through collective bargain­
ing agreements and/or historically determined institutionalized mechanisms. 
Work rules and procedures are clearly spelled out, providing guidelines 
for both employees and management. As a result, workers are protected 
from arbitrary managerial decision making and have established grievance 
procedures in the event of alleged abuses.
Michael Wachter describes the growth of internal labor markets and 
their isolation from external labor market forces as follows:
...complex employment relationship(s) (have) 
developed...because of the elaboration of tasks 
that are specific to a job and hence require 
specific training. Because of institutional 
realities the competitive model's description
46Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, "Equal Employment 
Opportunity in Boston" in Industrial Relations (No. 9, 1969-1970, pp.324- 
339), p.325.
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of a labor market based on demand and supply for 
each job does not apply. Most jobs are unique and 
lack an external market...New workers are used 
principally to fill entry jobs while most higher- 
level positions are filled by promotion from 
within...Workers already in a firm...enjoy a degree 
of monopoly over their jobs. '
That training in internal markets is specific goes a long way in explain­
ing why turnover is lower in primary than secondary labor markets.
Gary Becker points out that employees with specific training have less 
incentive to quit (they are earning more than they could elsewhere), and 
firms have less incentive to fire them (the firm bore the cost of 
training) than employees with no training or general training.^
In addition to holding a degree of monopoly over their current jobs, 
workers in an internal market have a monopoly over the jobs on the next 
rung of the internal job ladder. Michael Piore has done considerable 
research on worker mobility patterns in what he calls "an attempt to
formalize the intuitive notion that socioeconomic movement in our society
49is not random but tends to occur in more or less regular channels."
He distinguishes points along these mobility chains stations, claiming 
a particular station includes not only a job, but other points of social 
and economic significance.
Piore is quick to note that mobility chains are found only in pri­
mary internal labor markets. In fact,
Michael L. Wachter, "Primary and Secondary Labor Markets: A
Critique of the Dual Approach" in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 
(no.3, 1974, pp.637-693), p.643.
48Gary S. Becker, Human Capital Second Edition, (New York: National




...the distinction between the primary and the 
secondary sectors is that the mobility chains in 
the former constitute some kind of ladder along 
which there is progress towards higher paying and 
higher status jobs. In the secondary sector... 
jobs do not fall into any progression of this 
kind: they are held in a more or less random
fashion....^
Most segmentation theorists would agree with Piore that the existence 
and functioning of an internal labor market is the major distinction 
between primary and secondary labor markets.
This concludes my descriptive review of the primary and secondary 
labor market. I will now present an operational framework for the 
analysis of labor market duality. This will enable us to see what a 
dual labor market would look like if we could observe one in operation, 
and provide a lead in for discussing macro-policy implications stemming 
from the dualist approach to the study of labor markets.
An Operational Framework for the Study of Labor Market Duality
The existence of labor market duality in the macroeconomy is an
empirical issue which forms the base for the next three chapters of
this dissertation. As a conceptual issue, however, the question is:
Would a cross sectional picture of the occupational structure, whether
confined to a local labor market or on a national scale, indicate the
presence of labor market duality? Glen Cain provides an illustration
as to how such a test should proceed:
Assume that we could agree upon a unidimensional 
scale to measure the quality...of occupations...
Let this measure of job quality be measured on the 
horizontal axis and the number of workers on the 
vertical axis. The simplest test of duality is 





If we assume that most jobs reside in primary labor markets, then the 




Index of Job 
Quality
Jobs falling in the lower mode would be designated secondary, while
those further out from the origin on the horizontal axis would be
primary labor market jobs.
David Gordon makes an attempt at developing such a test in his
Ph.D. dissertation. Gordon devises what he called a "dual labor market
factor" and finds it to be an important explicator of the variance in
his data on occupations in two ghetto labor markets. A ranking of jobs
by their scores on this factor was bimodally distributed, permitting a
separation of the jobs into primary and secondary clusters, with job
characteristics corresponding roughly to the hypothesized characteristics 
52in the two markets. Gordon’s results indicate the viability of Cain’s
conceptual approach to the study of labor market duality.
52Richard C. Edwards, Michael Reich and David M. Gordon, "Introduc­
tion" in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et. al. 
(Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Co. 1975), p.xviii.
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The Extent of Secondary to Primary Mobility
Of equal, if not greater, importance is the degree to which the
barriers which separate the secondary from the primary labor market
prevent intermarket mobility. Robert Flanagan goes as far as to state,
"the crux of any theory of labor market segmentation is the mechanism or
institutional barriers which truncate competition by precluding mobility
53between the various labor market segments." A strict interpretation
of the dual theory would hold that mobility between sectors is virtually
nonexistent; the sector in which a worker initially finds employment will
be the sector in which he will remain his entire working career. A
less strict, and perhaps more tenable, interpretation would be that
mobility (primarily upward) can occur, but the reasons for such mobility
are external to the individual worker.
Since nonwhite workers are over represented in secondary sector
jobs, dual labor theory takes on aspects of being an economic theory of
discrimination. If primary employers only hire white males, then blacks,
regardless of their education or level of competence, will be excluded
from the more attractive primary job slots and forced to accept degrading
secondary sector employment. Flanagan points out:
it is not the inaccessibility of education that is 
stressed by the dualists but the barriers emphasized . 
include the culture of the ghetto...and overt disy 
crimination by white employers and labor unions.
Even when nonwhites gain access to primary market occupations, discri­
minatory policies act to channel them into mobility chains (internal 
labor markets) which differ substantially in terms of promotional
53Robert J. Flanagan, "Segmented Market Theories and Racial 




opportunities from those reserved for white male employees. In internal 
labor markets where white and nonwhite workers appear to move up the 
ranks together, there may exist job ceilings for the latter, effectively 
restricting supervisory and managerial positions to the domain of the 
white workers.
Besides the discriminatory aspects, mobility out of the secondary
labor market is also restricted, due to the very nature of the social
relations of production in the low wage sectors of the economy. Since
employment is usually transitory, on-the-job training is often absent,
and experience does not serve to increase productivity since performance
levels plateau after a very short time. Howard Birnbaum sums up the
dualists' position on the effects of career origins by stating:
...once career origin is determined, opportunities for 
future job movement can narrow because of discrimina­
tion, limited opportunities for training, certification, 
promotion, and the differential development of "affec­
tive" personality traits.^
Hence, in the context of economic discrimination, most dualists 
would argue that barriers separating the primary from the secondary 
labor market can be reduced if government authorities strengthen the 
enforcement of existing civil rights legislation. Human resource 
development programs aimed at increasing the human capital of minority 
workers will not enable them to escape the confines of the secondary 
labor market unless primary employers and unions can be forced to change 
their hiring policies.
Critics of dual theory have argued that mobility from secondary to 
primary labor markets occurs to an extent that cannot be reconciled with
55Howard Birnbaum, "The Economic Effects of Career Origins" in 
Edwards, et. al. op.cit., p. 154.
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the institutional barriers that dualists claim restrict mobility.
What is oftentimes overlooked is that such mobility is temporary in 
nature and tends to coincide with expansionary periods of the business 
cycle. Primary employers may be willing to relax their hiring criteria 
when labor markets for educated white males tighten, thereby granting 
"temporary" primary status to secondary sector workers. As soon as the 
expansion peaks and the contraction stage of the cycle sets in, these 
workers are let go and find themselves either unemployed or back in low 
wage sector jobs. Thus, the very structure of primary labor markets 
serves to support and propagate hierarchical distinctions within the 
working class.
Dual Labor Markets and Macro-Policy
While the incidence of intersector mobility is primarily an empiri­
cal issue, on a conceptual level, the more strict interpretation of dual 
labor theory provides a viable explanation for understanding why a 
mature capitalist economy can experience rising levels of inflation in 
the midst of high rates of unemployment. Traditional Keynesian analysis 
holds that Inflationary pressures come into being as aggregate demand 
surges above full employment levels.When aggregate demand falls short 
of aggregate supply, producers cut back production and unemployment 
results. Since the Keynesian approach to unemployment is quite similar 
to the queue theory, if government macro-policies stimulated expansion 
then almost everyone in the line would be absorbed.
For a fuller discussion of traditional macro-policy and its 
short-comings, see Howard Sherman's Stagflation A Radical Theory of 
Unemployment and Inflation.
"^Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, "Unemployment and the 
Dual Labor Market" in The Public Interest, (Number 38, Winter 1975) 
pp.67-79), p.67.
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Due to excess capacity, prices would remain stable until the expansion 
approached full employment levels of output. Thus, Keynesian policy 
can explain inflation or unemployment, not inflation and unemployment.
If the labor market is viewed as consisting of primary and secondary 
sectors, then, given the structural barriers which limit mobility, an 
explanation of unemployment and inflation becomes straightforward. The 
effects of expansionary fiscal and/or monetary policies are only felt in 
primary labor markets. As aggregate demand expands, labor supply in 
primary labor markets tightens. Since primary employers are reluctant 
to alter their hiring practices, the expansion results in upward pres­
sure on wages and prices.
The secondary labor market, on the other hand, remains largely 
unaffected by expansionary macro-policy. The chronically high rates of 
unemployment and instability which characterize this sector persist, 
despite the attempts of policy makers to reduce unemployment. What we 
end up with is a worsening of the unemployment inflation dilemma; there 
is more inflation yet no reduction in unemployment. In other words, 
traditional policy results in outward shifts in the Phillips curve, 
even though this was not what the policy makers had in mind.
There are several implications for public policy which follow from
this approach. Piore argues that expansion must entail more than just
the creation of new jobs. He states, "the added jobs must be primary
58and secondary workers must be hired to perform them." Fiscal policies 
should be aimed directly at the secondary work force, whether they be in 
the form of incentives for private industry to locate in depressed 




In such a way as to provide a viable alternative to secondary private 
employment, competitive pressure may force low wage industries to 
upgrade and take on primary market characteristics. This, along with 
antidiscrimination policies to open up primary markets, will, according 
to most dualists, reduce unemployment rates without contributing to 
inflationary pressures in the economy.
Radical Interpretations
The most important contribution of radical economists to dual
labor theory has centered around their attempt to integrate the process
of market segmentation into the dynamics of monopoly capitalism. Reich,
Gordon, and Edwards define labor market segmentation as the:
historical process whereby political-economic forces 
encourage the division of the labor market into 
separate submarkets, or segments, distinguished by 
different labor market characteristics and behavior 
rules.
Although some radicals claim the labor market is divided into numerous 
noncompeting sectors,^ most radicals would have little trouble with the 
dualist dichotomization of the labor market into primary and secondary 
sectors discussed above.
What the radicals emphasize are the ramifications of market segmen­
tation on the ability of the working class to develop a unified conscious­
ness and awareness of their position as a class in opposition to capital.^
59Michael Reich, David M. Gordon and Richard C. Edwards, "A Theory 
of Labor Market Segmentation" in American Economic Review (May 1973, 
pp.359-365), p.359.
*^ See Barry Bluestone, et. al., Low Wages and the Working Poor, Ch.2.
^See Stanley Aronowitz False Promises for a useful discussion of 
the barriers to the formation of class consciousness.
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According to Howard Wachtel, "fragmentation of the working class...has
eroded and negated the tendency toward the consolidation of a working 
62class." Fostering divisions within the working classes has histori­
cally served the interests of capital. Radicals point out that discri­
minatory hiring policies, differential job ladders and market segmenta­
tion create a stratified working class in which the more priveledged 
workers seek to isolate and protect their advantages. Thus, labor 
market segmentation, by dividing workers, aids in the reproduction of 
capitalist hegemony.^
Capitalist Development and the Segmentation of Labor Markets
Marx's description of the general laws of capitalist development
provides a starting point for most radical analyses of labor market
stratification. Marx was aware that over time, competitive capital
would give way to increasing concentration of capital. It was during
this transition from competitive to monopoly capital that segmentation
64of the labor market arose. Although this may sound similar to the 
institutionalists cited earlier, radicals add that segmentation of the 
labor force was a response by capital to the homogenization of the 
work force and the increasing removal of individual skills which may 
have encouraged worker solidarity as a class. This is quite different 
from the institutionalist's view that internal job structures developed 
with the "growing diversification and specialization of jobs."
62
Howard M. Wachtel, "Class Consciousness and Stratification in the 




Katherine Stone, in an excellent review of the development of 
Internal labor markets in the steel industry, concludes that "the 
development of hierarchy in the labor force was not in response to the 
increased complexity of jobs, but rather a device to counter the 
increased simplicity and homogeneity of jobs."^ ~* Stone notes that the 
institution of the job ladder served the interests of capital in two 
ways:
First, it gave workers a sense of vertical mobility 
...and was an incentive to work harder...(Second) 
was that it gave employers more leverage in which to 
maintain discipline. The system pitted each worker 
against all others in rivalry for advancement and 
undercut any feeling of unity which might develop 
among them. °
The important thing to realize is that at the same time the internal 
market developed, the fragmentation and simplification of individual 
jobs reached its highest level.
Stone's findings for the steel industry can be generalized to
account for the widespread development of internalized labor structures.
Reich, Gordon, and Edwards argue that the increasing oligopolization of
industry was threatened by the proletarianized work force which, in the
competitive era, became a homogeneous commodity.87 In order to combat
the increasing social nature of large scale production, capital embarked
on a tactic to divide the work force. The results of this were the
institution of new managerial techniques, internal job ladders, and
68hierarchical and bureaucratic organization of production.
65Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel 





Radicals do not offer much in the way of public policy. Basically, 
the radical view is that since a segmented labor force is functional 
to capitalist hegemony and since the state exists to serve the interests 
of capitalists, it is unreasonable to expect any significant policies 
to aid disadvantaged secondary workers.
Conclusions
The purpose of this literature review was to provide an analytic 
description of the primary and secondary labor market and to indicate 
the major trends of thought relating to labor market segmentation. The 
brief historical review of noncompeting groups showed dual theory has had 
considerable precedence in the annals of economic thought. What dis­
tinguishes the dual approach from earlier theories is its growing 
acceptance among economists and its applicability to such important 
contemporary issues as the perpetuation of low-wage sectors of the 
economy, the plight of disadvantaged workers, and the co-existence of 
rising rates of inflation and high levels of unemployment. Although neo­
classical theory remains the dominant view of most establishment economists,
segmented labor market theories have won wide appeal to many younger, left
leaning economists. There is no doubt that this acceptance reflects the 
increasing problems of neoclassical theory in trying to explain an 
objective reality characterized by monopoly capitalism, discrimination, 
and other institutional constraints.
In the following chapter, I review several attempts at constructing 
empirical models of labor markets in order to determine the existence of
duality. Some of the problems encountered in going from a conceptual to
empirical framework will be discussed, especially how one defines 
occupations as residing in the primary or secondary labor market. I hope
that by combining the detailed conceptual description of the secondary 
and primary sectors with the presentation of the results of econometric 
models depicting market duality, I will give the reader a thorough 
background in segmentation theory. I will then be in a position to 
discuss my own contributions to this field.
CHAPTER III
EMPIRICAL STUDIES REVIEW
In recent years, a small but growing number of economists have 
tried to substantiate or refute the existence of labor market segmen­
tation by means of empirical models. The purpose of this chapter is to 
review several of the more important econometric studies of labor 
market duality, in order to determine the extent to which the models 
reflect the conceptual hypothesis of dual theory, to assess the strengths 
and weaknesses of the models, and to pinpoint areas where additional 
research is needed. The chapter begins with a brief discussion of the 
"truncation problem", followed by a review of the ways in which 
researchers have classified occupations as primary and secondary. I 
then discuss three basic types of regression models which have appeared 
in the literature: (1) wage and earnings models, (2) probability of
primary employment models, and (3) mobility models. The chapter con­
cludes with my suggestions as to where further research is warranted 
and what I plan to do to advance the state of knowledge of dual labor 
markets.
A serious methodological issue has been levied against empirical 
studies of labor market segmentation. This is the so-called truncation 
problem. Glen G. Cain, in a lengthy critique of segmentation theory, 
asserts:
...tests almost invariably suffer from a methodo­
logical flaw - that of fitting the regression to 
a sample that is truncated on the values of the 
dependent variable - with the result that the esti­




What Cain is claiming is that if we demarcate secondary jobs according 
to low educational levels, skill requirements, income, and so forth, 
and then run regressions using these variables to explain income differ­
entials, the coefficients of the independent variables will be biased 
downward, leading to conclusions that human capital variables do not 
influence earnings in the secondary labor market. The flaw lies in 
that we have previously defined secondary jobs as those requiring minimal 
human capital endowments, so that we have assumed the existence of the 
relationship we are actually trying to test for.
Cain presents the truncation problem diagramatically as follows: 
Suppose we take an earnings/education profile for all workers, and 
estimate the relation between the two factors. We may end up with the
profile given in the diagram below, where line 'a' is the best fitting
2





If we truncate the sample at E^ , and label jobs with earnings OE^ secon­
dary, and fit a regression on this subsample (line 'b'), we "guarantee
^Glen G. Cain, "The Challenge of Segmented Labor Market Theories to 
Othodox Theory: A Survey", Journal of Economic Literature (Dec. 1976,
Vol. XIV, No. 4), p.1246.
2Ibid. p.1247.
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that the simple regression relation between education and earnings will
3
be lessened (or even) approach zero." What Cain acknowledges, but 
delegates to a footnote, is that the downward bias is only guaranteed if 
the model tested is of the form:
Earn = Educ +y
When multiple regression is used, there is no longer any guarantee of a 
4
downward bias.
Since all the segmentation models discussed here, as well as the 
ones to be developed in future chapters, use multiple regression analysis, 
Cain's claim of guaranteed bias leading to results favorable to dual 
theory is called into question. I am not saying there is no chance of 
downwardly biased regression coefficients - only that such results are 
not internally guaranteed given the specification of the models. Since 
the problem has its origins in the formulation of primary-secondary 
classification schemes, it seems fitting to begin our discussion of 
empirical studies by looking at the various ways researchers have clas­
sified occupations.
Classification Systems
In his Ph.D. thesis, Paul Andrisani devises a classification system 
based on 1960 Census reported median earnings of the male labor force 
for three digit occupational and industrial codes. Based on these earn­
ings, Andrisani claims that occupations and industries may be hierarchi­
cally ranked, and cut-off points determined, for defining jobs as primary
3Ibid. p.1246.
^Arthur Goldberger, "Linear Regression in Truncated Samples" cited 
in Cain op. cit., p.1246.
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or secondary. The cut-off points he establishes are such that jobs 
are considered primary if:
1) the occupation is one with median earnings 
greater than or equal to the median of the 
entire male labor force and the industry is 
one with median earnings of at least $4303, or
2) the industry is one with median earnings greater 
than or equal to the median of the entire male 
labor force and the occupation is one with median 
earnings of at least $4187.^
Jobs were deemed secondary if:
1) occupation is one with median earnings below $4187 
and the industry is one with median earnings below 
the median of the entire male labor force, or
2) the industry is one with median earnings below 
$4303 and the occupation is one with median earn­
ings below the median of the entire male labor 
force.7
The cut-off points of $4303 and $4187 were selected on the grounds that 
industries (occupations) with median earnings below $4303 ($4187)
g
employed one-third of the total male labor force in 1959.
In an appendix to his thesis, Andrisani attempts to justify his 
classification criteria by means of factor analysis, and by comparing 
his results with the responses of a panel of eleven knowledgeable labor 
market analysts who were asked to rank occupations as secondary, 
intermediate, primary or uncertain. He does not give us any numerical 
breakdowns as to the number of secondary (primary) occupations, or cite 
examples of secondary jobs so that we can see the "results" of classi­
fying occupations in this manner. Furthermore, he states that there are
^Paul J. Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market 





some jobs which are considered neither primary nor secondary, but again 
we are not told how many, or which jobs fall into this "intermediate" 
category.
A more basic criticism that can be levied against classifying occupa­
tions in terms of income levels is that such a system does not take into
9
account the nature of jobs. While earnings figure predominantely in 
demarcating occupations as primary or secondary, other factors also have 
to be taken into account. These include the issues of control and worker 
autonomy, status, preparation, i.e., educational and/or vocational, and 
stability of employment. While these may be highly correlated with 
earnings, it is by no means inherently safe to assume so. On the other 
hand, trying to incorporate these types of characteristics increases the 
subjectivity of one's classification system.
Paul Osterman, in an article entitled, "An Empirical Study of Labor 
Market Segmentation", divides census occupations into three groups: 
Secondary jobs, lower tier primary and upper tier primary occupations. 
Secondary sector jobs are demarcated according to the usual characteris­
tics of these jobs, i.e., low wages, Instability of employment, etc., 
while the distinction between upper and lower tier primary occupations 
is based on the "degree of autonomy and personal participation enjoyed 
by workers in that occupation.
After acknowledging the inherent subjectivity involved in any
attempt to segment occupations, Osterman states, "the author's judgement
11was used to place each occupation in its proper segment."
9
MichaelA. Carter and Martin Carney, Theories of Labor Markets and 
Worker Productivity (discussion paper 74-7, Menlo Park, Calif., Portola 
Institute, 1974), p. 46.
■^ Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation" in 
Industrial and Labor Relations Review, (July 1975), p.513.
The resulting classification system, given in the appendix to his study,
shows that, "there is a high degree of correspondence between the upper
tier (of the primary labor market) and the top segment of the Duncan
12(Socio-economic Index) scale and between the secondary sector and the
13lower tail of the Duncan scale". Since the Duncan index depends, in 
part, on educational and income levels, occupations in Osterman's upper 
tier are, for the most part, high income and education occupations, 
while those in the secondary sector are low income, low education jobs.
One of the most comprehensive attempts to devise a primary/secondary 
classification system can be found in Samuel Rosenberg's Ph.D. thesis, 
"The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Consequences". Rosenberg
makes use of a dissertation by Robert E.B. Lucas, "Working Conditions, 
Wage Rates and Human Capital: A Hedonic Study", which "links the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles job classification system with that 
of the Bureau of the Census."^ This gives detailed job characteristics 
of the more broadly defined census occupation classifications. Since 
Rosenberg classifies census occupations as primary or secondary, this 
"link up" with D.O.T. information permitted in-depth analysis of the 
content of occupations prior to primary/secondary specification.
Rosenberg starts by noting five basic characteristics of secondary
jobs:
(1) Low pay,
(2) Poor working conditions,
(3) High labor turnover,
12Otis D. Duncan, "A Socioeconomic Index for all Occupations", in 
Occupations and Social Status, ed. Albert J. Reiss, Jr. (New York: Free 
Press of Glencoe, Inc. 1961), pp.263-275.
13Osterman, p.513.
14Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Con­
sequences" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,1975), 
p.32.
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(4) Little chance for advancement, ^
(5) Arbitrary and capricious supervision.
His procedure may be summarized as follows: Secondary jobs skill
requirements should not be determined by educational levels because of
artificially imposed credentialism, but by the level of Specific
Ovcational Preparation (SVP) and General Educational Developement (GED)
required for their performance. He argues that if a Census occupation
has a 0.6 probability of an SVP level of less than three (job takes less
16than 3 months to learn), the occupation may be a secondary one. A 
similar argument is posed for GED levels. Also included is a "variable 
which measures whether a job involves doing tasks only under specific 
instructions allowing little or no room for independent action or judge­
ment in working out problems."'*'7 If a Census occupation displays a 
strong probability of having this trait, it may be a secondary job.
Since income is an important determinant, Rosenberg uses the BLS mini­
mum budget for a family of four as a cut-off point. He accurately points 
out that there are some job characteristics (supervising, instructing,
planning activities of others) in addition to high wages, which in and
18of themselves warrant the occupation a primary classification.
If, using Rosenberg's terminology, we demarcate SVP, GED, instruc­
tion and low wages to be secondary job criteria, and the remainder 





A job is said to be secondary if it qualifies for 
secondary employment on (a) all four criteria and 
is not eliminated by the other criteria, (b) on 
three criteria and is not eliminated by the other 
criteria or (c) on SVP and hour wa . . .
eliminated by the other criteria. ^
Rosenberg admits that a certain amount of personal judgement enters
the analysis, insofar as some jobs which turned out to be secondary were
respecified simply because he felt they better belonged in the primary
sector. Nevertheless, I judge this approach to be superior to any of
the other classification systems I have had at my disposal. This system
accounts for the nature of secondary jobs far for thoroughly than
Andrisani's income determination schema, and is obviously more scientific
than simply using one's own personal judgement, as was the case with
Osterman. It is for these reasons that I have decided to use Rosenberg's
occupational classification system as the basis for demarcating jobs as
primary or secondary in the models I develop in the ensuing chapters.
Wage and Earnings Models
Andrisani's wage determination model produces results only mildly 
supportive of dual labor theory. He does find that within the primary 
sector, for white workers, educational attainment, age, and status
20(Duncan Index) of first job were directly related to rates of pay.
This is obviously consistent with the dualist view that within the pri­
mary market, human capital factors systematically affect earnings. It 
is interesting to note that educational attainment, measured in either 
continuous form or in terms of high school graduation, increases primary,




nonwhite earnings significantly more than for primary whites. On the
other hand, age, used as a proxy for experience, is not significant for
blacks. Andrisani concludes that, "among blacks in primary jobs...the
data do not suggest as systematic a screening process as is observed 
21among the whites."
The results most at odds with the dual theory are those for secon­
dary sector whites and blacks. According to the dualists, human capital 
factors should not serve to predict earnings, nor should employers 
exercise any systematic preference functions in their hiring practices 
in secondary labor markets. These basic propositions are not substan­
tiated in the Andrisani model, in that for secondary whites, educational 
attainment (continuous and discrete), age and marital status are all
significant and important explicators of wages rates; while for blacks,
22graduation and marital status prove significant. Hence, Andrisani
questions the widely held dualist view that variations in wages should
be unrelated to levels of human capital. He points out that "even in
the secondary labor market employers...appear to differentiate between
blacks with high school degrees and those with lesser amounts of 
23education."
Using the triparte classification system discussed earlier, Osterman 
ran a series of earnings determination regression models in order to 
determine whether or not the wage setting process differs between the 






results are highly favorable to segmentation theory in that,
in the secondary labor market earnings (depended) 
only on the amount of time worked. Experience did 
not contribute to earnings, nor did education (or 
race).24
In addition, his findings reveal these same variables to be significant 
explicators of earnings in both the upper and lower tier of the primary 
market. Osterman's interpretation of his results suggests that the 
human capital model explains earnings determination only in the primary 
market. Secondary employers do not differentiate among workers, while 
primary employers stress factors such as race, age and education in their 
hiring decisions.
He concludes by noting that the failure of manpower programs can be
attributed in part to the realization that these programs are not
"attuned to the realities of the labor market" since "policies designed
to augment the human capital of secondary workers are not likely to
25improve their earnings."
William Kruse, in a recent comment on Osterman’s model, claims the
favorable (from a dualist perspective) results stem from the way Osterman
classifies occupations producing a downward bias on the coefficients of
26the human capital variables for secondary worker earning function.
He further criticizes Osterman's use of a cross sectional earnings func­
tion to generate policy recommendations which require longitudinal data. 
According to Kruse,
the implications of labor market segmentation that 
have relevance for public policy are derived from 
the alleged restrictions of a certain group of 
individuals to 'dead end' or secondary jobs...(This)
"^Osterman. p.513.
25Osterman. p.521.
26William J. Kruse, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation: 
Comment" in Industrial and Labor Relations Review (Vol.30, No.7, Jan.1977), 
p.223.
cannot be tested via the estimation of separate 
cross sectional earnings functions...need longi­
tudinal (studies).... 2'
Thus, Kruse stresses the mobility aspects of policy programs within the
dualist context. It is not surprising to find that education and/or
training fail to increase secondary earnings. The intention of human
investment programs, he argues, "is to enable participants to move into 
28nonsecondary jobs." Since Osterman uses only cross sectional data,
his results cannot be considered damaging to the "efficacy of human
capital investment programs."
Osterman's reply to Kruse's critique is several fold. First, he
claims his classification system does not result in truncating the
29sample along the dependent variable. As we saw earlier, Osterman 
tries to incorporate such factors as autonomy, working conditions and job 
stability in deciding into which segment an occupation belongs. However, 
the close parallel between his system and the Duncan index does indicate 
earnings are an important factor in determining which occupations are 
primary and secondary.
Osterman's response to Kruse's claim that longitudinal data are 
necessary to determine the efficacy of human investment programs is 
not overly convincing. Basically, he states that his intention was to 
discover whether the relationship between earnings and several key vari­
ables differs in different segments of the labor market, and whether the
30differences conform to those predicted by dual labor market theory.
27Ibid. p.220.
28Ibid.
29Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation: 
Reply" in Industrial and Labor Relations Review (Vol.30, No.7, Jan.1977), 
p.223.
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Finding that conformity exists does strengthen the dual theory, but 
his failure to examine the mobility issue tempers viability of his 
policy recommendations. The policy implications Osterman derives from 
his study are consistent with dual labor theory, namely that policies 
should be aimed at changing labor demand conditions, as opposed to 
improving the human capital (supply side) of secondary workers. What 
remains subject to controversy is whether or not this recommendation 
logically follows from the results of his model. Hopefully, the models 
discussed in the following chapter which include mobility aspects will 
shed some light on this issue.
Probability of Primary Employment Models
Andrisani has devised a model which examines the likelihood of a
worker's first job being in the primary labor market. The rationale
for such a model lies in the dualist continention that a worker will
remain in the sector in which he first finds employment. Andrisani's
results indicate that educational attainment, measured either in years
completed or in terms of graduation status, significantly increases the
probability of primary employment for whites. Among blacks, however,
"educational attainment appears of little consequence and black dropouts
31fare no worse than graduates."
In order to account for the fact that within his sample workers began 
their careers under different phases of the business cycle, Andrisani 
includes a variable to measure labor market conditions at the time of 
initial entry into the work force. Specifically, a dummy variable was 




32while if first job occurred between 1964 and 1966, a one was assigned.
His finding that for whites the probability of a primary first job is
higher when labor markets are tight, while for blacks labor market con-
33ditions do not make much difference, supports segmentation theory, 
since blacks, as a result of their over representation in the secondary 
sector, do not stand to benefit from expansionary aggregate demand 
policies which are confined to mainstream labor markets.
Socioeconomic origins are statistically significant for both color 
groups. Although this result supports dual and radical interpretations 
of the labor process, severe multicollinearity among the regressors in 
his model dampens the viability of his results.
Samuel Rosenberg has developed a two-equation model which, in 
addition to observing the effects of human capital variables on a worker's 
current labor market status, addresses itself to the influence that a 
worker's first job has on the probability of current employment in the 
primary labor market. Since I use a similar model, a more detailed 
discussion of the format of this type of model can be found in the 
following chapter. Here it will be sufficient to discuss some of 
Rosenberg's more important findings.
His data indicate that a worker who began his career in the primary 
market is quite likely to be currently employed in a primary sector occu­
pation. In fact, a primary first job was found to increase the probability
34of primary current job by at least 20 percent.





of primary employment, the results are somewhat surprising. College
attendance, as expected, increased the probability of primary employment,
but there was no significant difference between completion of 9-11
years of schooling and high school graduation in terms of increasing
the likelihood of primary employment. Thus, Rosenberg states:
There does not seem to be a credential effect in 
terras of finishing high school leading to a great 
increase in the conditional probability of holding 
a primary job over the completion of just 9-11 
years of schooling.35
For some groups, participation in a vocational training program
significantly increased the likelihood of primary employment, while
36for other groups no significant relationship was found. Finally, his 
data suggest that experience (years in the labor force) does not increase 
the probability of current employment in the primary sector. He cor­
rectly points out that this result
is consistent with the expectations of dual labor 
market theory which argues that increased labor 
force experience does not necessarily lead to 
greater probability of primary employment for it 
depends on whether this experience is in the 
primary or secondary labor market.37
Mobility Models
Several empirical studies have included a model to determine the 
likelihood of upward, secondary to primary, mobility. Basically, these 
models examine the incidence of mobility for workers in the secondary 
sector in time period t, who at a later date (t + m) have either remained
35Rosenberg, p.123.
36There was little uniformity as to which color groups benefited 
from vocational training. In some cities, vocational training was sig­
nificant for blacks, in others whites, and in one both benefited.
37Rosenberg, p.127.
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in the secondary market or have moved into primary market occupations.
A vector of explanatory variables is postulated and regression analysis
is performed, in order to determine which, if any, variables act to
systematically affect the probability of mobility.
Andrisani includes such a model in his thesis. He finds neither
educational attainment nor vocational training to increase the likelihood
of upward mobility. Even after respecifying his model by including a
dummy variable to differentiate between high schoool graduates and
dropouts, his data indicate, "there is no evidence that graduates are
38more likely to advance to primary jobs than dropouts." Moreover,
the results of his model lead Andrisani to conclude:
...manpower policies aimed at moving disadvantaged 
youths from secondary to primary jobs by investing 
in their human capital (education and.training)...can 
draw no support from these findings.
For whites, the only important explanatory variable was marital
status, while for blacks, region of the country (1 if not South, 0 if
South) was significant and important. After running the basic model in
a slightly different form, age was found to increase the likelihood
of secondary to primary mobility for white workers. Thus, Andrisani
concludes, "secondary sector confinement...seems to result (in part)
from insufficient labor market e xposure.This conclusion warrants
comment, because dual theory would be expected to be opposite continuous
exposure in the secondary labor market reduces the likelihood of upward





result. The question of the relation between age (experience) and 
labor market status will be reexamined and treated at greater length 
in the chapter where I develop several labor market models.
Samuel Rosenberg's upward mobility model fucuses mainly on educa­
tion and training as factors which affect the probability of moving from 
the secondary to the primary labor market. The model was used to examine
the likelihood of mobility for whites and blacks in Brooklyn, Cleveland,
41Detroit, and San Francisco. Since the relative importance of educa­
tion and training in explaining mobility differed widely not only 
between whites and blacks, but also within color cohorts in different 
cities, it is difficult to provide a general summary of his results. 
Nevertheless, several patterns are apparent. Vocational training, 
whether acquired while in school or in an institutional program, did not
/ 0 / *5
prove significant in increasing the probability of upward mobility. ’
Years in the labor force do not significantly increase the likelihood
of upward mobility. Whereas a significant negative relation between
years in the labor force and the probability of mobility would have been
highly supportive of dual labor theory, Rosenberg accurately points out
that his results are "consistent with the dual labor market hypothesis
which argues that increased experience in the secondary labor market
44 45would not necessarily lead to upward mobility." ’
41
For Brooklyn and San Francisco, separate regressions were also run for 
Spanish workers.
42Rosenberg, p.151.
43The sole exception was San Francisco blacks.
44Rosenberg, p.152.
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Rosenberg's findings concerning experience and mobility differ from 
Andrisani in that the latter argued confinement in the secondary sector 
resulted from a lack of labor market exposure.
48
The most serious problem lies in trying to ascertain a distinct 
pattern with regard to the role of education in the mobility process.
For whites in Brooklyn, and San Francisco, and Detroit blacks, "the 
education variables are significant...and the pattern shows that the
46more education one has, the greater the...probability of upward mobility."
For Cleveland whites and Brooklyn and San Francisco blacks, however,
virtually none of the educational variables proved significant. The
former results tend to substantiate the "human capital approach to mobility",
while the latter sugest that mobility, when it occurs, is in essence a
random occurrence. This leads Rosenberg to conclude:
the education results are such that all that can 
be said is that increasing years of education ^
may increase a person's chances of upward mobility.
In a recent article in The Journal of Human Resources, Duane E. Leigh 
presents a model which measures occupational mobility in such a way as 
to make preassigning occupations primary or secondary unnecessary. Using 
1970 Census and N.L.S. data, Leigh examines the determinants of occupa­
tional change for males in several age race cohort groupings. Instead of 
demarcating mobility in terms of movement from the secondary to the 
primary labor market, he measures occupational upgrading or downgrading 
on the basis of the change in the median income of the respondent's




48Duane E. Leigh, "Occupational Advancement in the Late 1960's: An
Indirect Test of the Dual Labor Market Hypothesis" in The Journal of 
Human Resources, (Vol.XI, No.2, Spring 1976), p.159.
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Leigh incorporates this methodology into the dualist perspective by 
denoting two propositions of dual theory:
(1) Large and systematic racial distinctions 
exist in the effect of interfirm mobility 
on occupational advancement, and
(2) Large and systematic racial differentials 
in intrafirm occupational advancement 
exist for workers of equivalent endowments.
Given Leigh's interpretation of dual labor theory, his empirical 
results indicate that there are no major differences in employment 
stability between whites and blacks in comparable age cohorts. Further­
more, "the impact of interfirm and interindustry shifts on occupational 
advancement does not appear to be systematically larger for whites than 
for b l a c k s . T h i s  leads him to reject his first hypothesis. Additional 
results, according to Leigh, call for the rejection of the second hypothesis 
as well. Both rejections are interpreted as providing support for neo­
classical labor market theory.
Leigh's analysis and methodology invite criticism on several counts. 
First, even the most cursory reading of dualist literature indicates 
that there are nonwage factors which must be considered when ranking occu­
pations. Coincident with this is the realization that the secondary sec­
tor is not perfectly competitive; wage rates, although low throughout, 
are not entirely uniform. It is possible for a worker to move from one
(1) Secondary jobs are characterized by a lack 
of occupational upgrading, and
(2) Black workers are disproportionately confined 
to the secondary sector,




low wage job to another not quite so low wage job. This would tend to 
show up as an improvement in the present context, even though the worker 
may well have remained in the secondary sector. Finally, nowhere is the 
reader given any indication of the explanatory power of Leigh's models. 
Since using median occupational income rather than reported individual 
income can inject rather large errors into his dependent variables, it 
would not be surprising to find that Leigh's models have very little 
explanatory power.
Conclusions
The empirical models discussed in this chapter indicate that there is 
considerable diversification of opinion concerning the existence and func­
tioning of dual labor markets. Based upon their empirical results, con­
clusions regarding the existence of segmented labor markets range from 
outright rejection of their existence (Leigh) to strong acceptance 
(Osterman). While it is my feeling that no econometric model can unequi­
vocally prove the existence of labor market segmentation, previous research 
does indicate serious deficiencies in the traditional human capital queue 
theory approach to the labor market. The dual theory provides a viable 
alternative explanation of the labor process.
Numerous problems remain which the earlier research has not been able 
to come to terms with. Although Rosenberg's classification system con­
stitutes a marked advance over Andrisani's, there remains a need for a 
generally agreed upon dichotomization of occupations into primary and 
secondary sectors. Additional evidence concerning the functioning of 
labor markets in diverse geographic locales, such as predominantely non- 
urban labor markets, has been absent from the current literature. Such 
information is needed in order to make dual labor theory a more general 
theory of the labor process. Finally, it would be desirable to see a
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shift In research methodology away from the over-reliance upon econometric 
model building towards case studies of the structure of labor markets 
from which firms draw their manpower needs.
The following chapters constitute my attempt to improve and advance 
the state of knowledge of dual labor market theory. Two of the problems 
stated above will be directly addressed, namely the use of a sample which 
is largely composed on nonurban labor markets, and the inclusion of a 
case study of a local New Hampshire labor market. By combining econometric 
models with a case study, I hope to present a lucid description of New 
England labor markets, thereby gaining additional insight into the viability 




The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the econometric models 
which will be used in subsequent chapters to test for labor market seg­
mentation in New England. I begin by noting the data source and its 
appropriateness for examining dual labor theory. Next, I look at some 
of the limitations in the data base, specifically the numerical insigni­
ficance of nonwhite respondents. Finally, the three models are specified 
and the variables and their expected coefficients are discussed in the 
context of dual labor market theory.
The source of data used to test the segmentation models is the 1970 
Census of Population Public Use Sample tapes. In addition to personal 
and household characteristics such as marital status, age, education, 
occupation, etc., the Census in 1970, for the first time, included 
questions concerning the type of occupation the respondent was employed 
at five years earlier, i.e., in 1965.  ^ By classifying the 1965 and 1970 
occupations as primary or secondary, we can use the data to ascertain 
the importance of the previous sector of employment on current labor 
market standing. Furthermore, knowledge of labor market status five 
years ago is necessary in order to determine the probability of inter­
sectoral, secondary to primary, mobility.
Stanely Greene and others. "The 1970 Census of Population Occupation 
Classification System" in Statistical Reporter (No. 70-6, December 1967), 
pp.77-84.
The limitations encountered in using the Census data are twofold. 
First, for several New England states, the Census data does not specify 
whether or not the respondent resided in an S.M.S.A. or in an urban or 
rural area. Thus, it is not possible to include a variable demarcating 
area of residence within a state. Given that there are relatively few 
urban areas in Northern New England, the segmentation models will not be 
confined to urban labor markets, as has been the case with most earlier 
studies, but will test for the existence of, and factors contributing to, 
duality in an area which contains rural labor markets as well as urban 
markets.
The second limitation is more endemic to the population mix in New 
England than to the Census data for the U.S. as a whole. It turns out 
that there are too few nonwhite observations to warrant either the 
inclusion of race as a variable or to run separate regressions dividing 
the sample by race. The exclusion of a race variable may make for a 
rather severe test of labor market duality, since racial distinctions 
have consistently been a major facet of the theory and related policy 
prescriptions. It must be remembered, however, that segmentation theory 
is not just an economic theory of discrimination. Low wage secondary 
jobs are sometimes manned by whites, indicating that the factors which 
may be attributed to the segmentation process operate across racial 
boundaries.
Specification of the Models: Earnings Determination
The first model I plan to test is a set of earnings equations simi­
lar to those used by neoclassical economists to estimate the effect of a 
vector of human capital variables on annual earnings. In the dual labor 
market context, the model serves to test the influence of the independent
54
variables on earnings in both the primary and secondary labor markets.
In order to conform with labor market segmentation theory, certain variables 
should prove significant and important with respect to primary market 
earnings, but not significant in the secondary labor market.
It should be pointed out that this model does not test for the 
existence of dual labor markets. That duality exists is an a priori 
postulation. The primary and secondary labor markets are demarcated 
according to the classification system previously discussed. What I 
hope to show in these equations is that factors which are commonly said to 
influence earnings do not operate in a systematic fashion across the 
entire occupational spectrum. This can be accomplished by specifying a 
single earnings equation; running it separately on the primary and secon­
dary labor markets and observing the significance of the independent 
variables as explicators of earnings within and between the two sectors.
The model to be tested is specified as follows:
EARN = a + a. HSG + a~ 'Exp' + a~ Wks + a. VocT + ac Class + u o 1 2 r 3 4 5
where
EARN = Annual income for males aged 25-55 in the occupational cohort groupings, 
HSG = A dummy variable which takes on a value of 1 if the respondent completed 
12 or more years for formal education (high school graduate) and a value 
of 0 if less than 12 years of schooling were completed (did not graduate 
high school),
'Exp' = Potential labor force experience,
Wks = Weeks worked during 1969,
VocT = A dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the respondent participated 
in a vocational training program and 0 if no vocational training was 
undertaken,
Class = Class of Worker, a dummy variable used to demarcate those persons 
employed in the private sector (1) from those in the public sector 
(0),
u is an error term.
Explanation of Variables
High school graduation status is used in the models to test for the 
existence of a diploma effect on employment opportunities and remuneration 
for both secondary and primary market workers. I have incorporated educa­
tion in the model in this manner, in lieu of using education as a con­
tinuous variable measuring years of educational attainment, because I feel 
there is a qualitative, as well as quantitative, impact on the returns to 
schooling that accrue as a result of obtaining a high school diploma. This 
is "smoothed" over when education is used as a continuous variable.
When education is defined as years of schooling completed, the 
coefficient (g) on education in an earnings model is interpreted as the 
amount by which income rises for each additional year of schooling completed. 
Thus, each year of schooling supposedly augments income by the same amount. 
This is tantamount to saying that "degree stations" do not have any 
independent influence on earnings. Furthermore, using education as a 
continuous variable makes it difficult to determine whether or not 
employers use the high school diploma as a screening device in order to 
restrict entry into better paying, more attractive occupations.
In either the continuous or dummy variable form, no attempt is made 
to take into account the quality of education, although one would naturally 
expect to find schools of different quality throughout the New England area. 
Here again, I feel graduation status to be superior to years of schooling 
completed, in that employers who use the high school diploma as a screening 
device are less apt to differentiate workers according to where they 
attended high school.
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According to dual labor theory, we should expect graduation status 
to be a significant and important explicator of earnings in the primary 
sector. Primary market employers often use graduation status as one of 
the requirements for employment. The "diploma effect" in the primary 
market should be reflected in considerably higher earnings for those 
workers who have completed at least twelve years of formal education. 
Traditional theory explains higher earnings for high school graduates as 
the monetary returns to investing in higher education. Beyond high 
school, the decision to forestall entering the labor market is grounded 
in the belief that future earnings will more than compensate for the 
earnings foregone by remaining in school. Put simply, the more educa­
tion, the better the chance of getting a high paying primary market 
occupation.
Whereas traditional theory holds that all workers should benefit
from increasing their educational attainment, the dualists maintain this
is only the case in the primary labor market. Thus, graduation status is
not expected to be a significant and important explicator of earnings
in the secondary labor market. Since educational attainment makes little
difference with respect to performance in secondary jobs, workers in
this sector are not expected to realize any monetary returns to completing 
2
high school. Given the perceived homogeneity of labor power in the 
secondary sector, formal education should not serve to increase worker 
productivity. Although this may be more attributable to the nature of 
the job than to the worker himself, education is not expected to serve its 
accustomed function of increasing the worker's (marginal) productivity and
2
David M. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment (Lexington, 
Mass.: D. C. Heath Company, 1972), p.117.
hence his wage.
Potential labor force experience is defined as age, minus years of 
schooling completed, minus six. I feel that this is superior to simply 
using age in the model, because the variable as defined equals the num­
ber of years in which a person could have been in the labor force in one 
or more jobs gaining work experience. For example, a thirty year old 
worker who has completed sixteen years of schooling could have eight 
years of work experience under his belt. If it is assumed that indivi­
duals receive training while they are at work, the returns to a year of 
0
work experience ( 'aexp— ) can used as a surrogate to measure the
3
returns to investment in on-the-job taining.
According to the human capital school, experience adds directly to
a worker's "endogenous" (marginal) revenue product, and will therefore
4
exert a positive effect on earnings. In the present context, only in 
the primary labor market should we expect experience to be an important 
explicator of earnings. The presence of internal labor markets charac­
terize most primary occupations. The internal labor market itself is 
characterized by mobility clusters which provide a rigid set of institu­
tionalized rules and regulations regarding promotional opportunities, sal­
ary scales, work rules and seniority. If we make the reasonable assump­
tion that it is to the worker's advantage to remain in, and move up, 
along the ranks of his initial mobility cluster, the experience variable
3
Lester C. Thurow, "The Occupational Distribution of the Returns to 
Education and Experience for Whites and Negroes" in Federal Programs for 
the Development of Human Resources (Washington, D.C.: Joint Economic
Committee, 1968), p.270.
4
Barry Allen Bluestone, "The Personal Earnings Distribution: Indivi­
dual and Institutional Determinants" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of 
Michigan, 1974), p.33.
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may also be looked at as a proxy for the returns to employment within an 
internal labor market. This view of experience as reflecting institu­
tionalized pay increments based (in part) on length of service  ^is 
considerably more comprehensive than the usual human capital approach to 
experience. This approach, in addition to on-the-job training, encom­
passes returns which may not be directly attributable to an increment in 
an individual's human capital.
Labor force experience should not prove an important determinant of 
earnings in secondary market jobs. Secondary jobs, by definition, 
require minimal, if any, training and once learned are simply repeated day 
in, day out by those performing them. On-the-job training is virtually
non-existent it is neither profitable to the employer, since O.J.T.
will not increase productivity, nor to the employee, since O.J.T. will 
not lead to higher wages. Thus, "experience" should not result in 
increasing the value of human capital and earnings to workers trapped in 
the secondary sector. The longer a person has been in the secondary 
sector, the better his knowledge may be regarding employment opportunities 
(the "best" of the "worst"). However, since wages are uniformly low, even 
knowledge concerning where the better jobs are should not have any impor­
tant influence on earnings.
Vocational training is the third human capital variable included in 
the earnings model. The importance of vocational training is debatable. 
Human capital theorists argue that participation in a vocational training 
program increases the value of a worker's human capital, and therefore 
his desirability to employers, which should result in a positive impact 
on earnings. Labor market segmentation theorists counter that within the
5Ibid.
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secondary labor market vocational training is superfluous with respect 
to the requirements of secondary jobs, and that employers have no incen­
tive to pay workers who may have had some vocational training any more 
than they pay those who have none. Even within the primary sector, 
uncertainty exists as to the influence of vocational training on earnings. 
Since pay scales in many internal labor markets are set by collective 
bargaining agreements or some other similar institutional arrangement, 
prior (to employment)completion of a vocational training program may not 
have any independent effect on earnings. Whether or not vocational 
training increases the probability of primary market employment is 
another matter which will be taken up in the second model.
Vocational training includes those persons reporting to have parti­
cipated in a vocational training program either in high school, as an 
apprentice, in a school of business, nursing or trades, technical insti­
tute, or armed forces.^
I have included "class of worker" in order to see the extent to 
which earnings in either the primary or secondary labor market are 
determined by employment in the private and public sector. Again, given 
the assumptions of dual labor theory, in the secondary sector class of 
worker should not prove to be a significant explicator of earnings.
Private sector primary workers, on the other hand, are expected to have 
considerably higher earnings than their counterparts in the public sector.
In both the primary and secondary labor market, the coefficient on 
weeks worked is expected to be positive and significant. In the secondary 
sector, given the presumed absence of the human capital variables as
U^.S. Department of Commerce, 1970 Census Users' Guide Part I (Bureau 
of the Census: U.S. Goverment Printing Office, 1970), p.17.
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explicators of earnings, weeks worked should serve to be the singular 
most important determinant of earnings. Since workers are perceived to 
be homogeneous commodities, and since wages are uniformly low throughout 
the secondary labor market, annual earnings should depend entirely on 
the amount of time (number of weeks) a worker spent on one or more jobs 
during the year.
In the primary labor market, whether or not a worker was employed 
full or part time will naturally influence earnings. But earnings 
should also vary systematically according to the human capital variables 
included in the model. Thus, a full time worker possessing a high school 
diploma and, say, ten years of "experience" should earn more than a 
similarly situated worker possessing less than ten years of experience.
In the secondary market, by comparison, earnings are not expected to 
show any systematic variation with respect to any of the independent 
variables except for weeks worked.
Probability of Primary Employment
The second model to be tested is a two equation model, the purpose 
of which is to determine the relative importance of a worker's labor 
market status five years ago, as an explicator of his current labor 
market status. This model closely follows the one used by Samuel Rosenberg 
in his study of factors which influence a person’s current labor market 
status in four low wage labor markets.^ The model may be specified as
^Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and




I. PR (Pri) = a + a.HSG + a_VocT + a0Class + a.Mar + acE, +o 1 2 3 4 5 1
a6E2 + a7E3+ W
II. Pr (Prl) = a + a.HSG + a_VocT + a.Class + a.Mar + acE. +o 1 2 3 k 5 1
afiE2 + A^ Eg + agOccup65 + v
where:
Prl = 1 if current job Is in the primary labor market;
0 if secondary.
HSG = 1 if high school graduate; 0 if less than 12 years 
formal education.
VocT = 1 if respondent participated in a vocational training 
program; 0 if not.
Class = 1 if current job is in the private sector; 0 if in 
the public sector.
Mar = 1 if currently married, spouse present; 0 if not married.
E^ = 1 if potential labor force experience (DPFE) is less
than or equal to 10 years; 0 if otherwise.
E2 = 1 if PLFE is greater than or equal to 21 but less than 
or equal to 30, 0 if otherwise.
Eg = 1 if PLFE is greater than 31.
Occupgg = 1 if job in 1965 was in the primary labor market; 0 if
in the secondary labor market.
In this model, the dependent variable is a dummy variable. Johnston
explains the logic behind dummy dependent variable models as follows:
...(the dummy) dependent variable takes on only 
two values, so that we may use unity to indicate 
the occurrence of the event and zero to indicate 
its non occurrence. If we run a multiple regres­
sion of such a dependent variable Y on several
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explanatory variables X, then we may interpret the 
calculated value of Y, for any given X, as an 
estimate of the conditional probability of Y, given 
X •
Thus the calculated value of "pri" for any given vector of explana­
tory variables will tell us the probability of current employment in a 
primary labor market occupation.
Explanation of Variables
Graduation status is included, since it is generally held that the 
higher one's educational attainment, the greater the chances are of 
securing a primary market occupation. In the present context, a signi­
ficant positive coefficient on HSG would indicate that a high school 
graduate is more likely to be employed in the primary labor market than 
a non-graduate. This is especially true, given the fact that many 
primary employers use the high school diploma as a screening device in 
their hiring practices. The expected relationship would therefore indi­
cate the existence of the "diploma" effect as an important selection 
criterion which serves to restrict entry into the primary labor market.
A strong positive coefficient on VocT would indicate that partici­
pation in a vocational training program enhances the probability of 
primary market employment. VDcational training programs are considered 
a major factor in increasing the potential productivity of labor market 
entrants, thereby improving their relative position on the employment 
queue along which primary employers hire. A significant non-positive 
coefficient on this variable would indicate that job training does not 
increase the probability of gaining access to a primary occupation. Such
J. Johnston, Econometric Methods Second Edition (New York: McGraw 
Hill Book Co., 1972), p.183.
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a result would necessitate a careful re-evaluation of the entire struc­
ture of vocational and job training programs.
Marital status is included, on the assumption that marriage "forces" 
a worker to adopt a more stable lifestyle which is conducive to employ­
ment in the primary sector. Primary employers may prefer married workers, 
on the grounds that family responsibilities provide greater assurance 
that the worker will remain with the firm and conform to the requirements 
thereof, in order to maintain a steady flow of income. Furthermore, 
Andrisani claims, "inclusion of marital status provides a crude measure
g
of the value employers place on marital status as a sign of maturation."
On this basis, a positive coefficient on marital status is to be
expected, although it remains to be seen whether or not it will prove a
significant factor in determining the probability of primary employment.
Potential labor force experience is included here as a set of dummy 
variables grouped in ten year intervals. The human capital approach to 
PLFE would be to treat it as general training which develops a set of 
productive abilities a worker can apply to any job.^ Then, the longer 
a worker has been developing his productive abilities, the greater the 
likelihood that he will be located in a high paying (primary) occupation.
According to segmentation theory, the above relationship between 
experience and occupation holds only within the primary labor market.
Given the constraints of the secondary labor market, experience does not 
serve to equip workers with either higher incomes or, more importantly, 
provide them with productive abilities necessary to get better jobs, i.e., 
to function in the primary labor market. For workers already in the
9
Paul James Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market 
Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), pp.47-48.
^Gary S. Becker, Human Capital Second Edition (New York: National 
Burea for Economic Research, 1975), pp.19-20.
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primary market, experience increases income, as outlined in the previous 
model. Thus, from a dualist viewpoint, the role of PLFE is internalized 
within the primary labor market and therefore should not be a sifnificant 
determinant of the probability of obtaining a primary market occupation.
The preceding variables are part of a worker's human capital. The
purpose of the first regression model in this section is to see the
extent to which these variables explain a worker's "current labor market
standing". By adding "occup^ ,." to the model, a major facet of dual labor
theory will be tested, namely the contention that once a person finds
himself in either the primary or the secondary labor market, the chances
11are he is going to remain there for his entire working career. A 
significant positive coefficient on "occup^ ,." would indicate the impor­
tance of worker’s earlier labor market standing on his current sector of 
employment. Concommitantly, the explanatory power of the latter model 
should be considerably greater than the model which includes only the 
human capital variables.
A nonsignificant or negative coefficient on "occup '' would be quite
03
damaging to the proponents of dual labor market analysis. Such a result 
would mean that the probability of a worker being in the primary labor 
market does not depend on whether or not the worker was in the primary 
market at an earlier stage in his working career. The argument that 
work history figures predominantly in current labor market standing would 
suffer a sizable loss of validity.
■^Unfortunately, the data source used in this study does not allow 
us to test the "strict" dualist proposition that a worker's "first job ^  
in the labor force...should predict the sector in which he presently works"
12 13
See Rosenberg for a similar model which uses first job in lieu of




The third model examines the probability of upward, secondary to 
primary, mobility from 1965 to 1970. A dummy dependent variable is 
regressed against a vector of binary variables, in order to determine 
the conditional probability of upward mobility. The equation may be 
specified as follows:
MOB = a + 3,1150 + a0VocT + a_Class + a.Mar + a_E. + a,E_ + a^E„ + p
O X  b j  ^  j x  o /  / j
where:
MOB = 1 if occupation in 1965 was in the secondary sector AND occupation 
in 1970 is in the primary sector; 0 if occupation in 1965 was in 
the secondary sector AND occupation in 1970 is in the secondary 
sector. (Independent variables remain as defined in the probability 
of primary employment model.)
Movement from the secondary to the primary sector, according to dual 
theory, is largely restricted to periods of high aggregate demand which 
tighten the primary market, forcing employers to either subcontract 
production into the secondary market or grant "temporary low level 
primary status" to secondary workers. Since the period under considera­
tion was one of rapidly rising aggregate demand (low unemployment), we 
might expect to find a considerable amount of mobility. It must be 
remembered that once aggregate demand subsides, most, if not all, of 
those temporary primary workers will find themselves out of work and 
back in the secondary labor market.
The crux of the mobility issue, in terms of this model and dual 
theory in general, lies not in temporary primary positions during periods 
of rising aggregate demand, but in terms of what, if any, worker charac­
teristics enhance the possibility of moving from secondary jobs to primary
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occupations. Are there any factors, human capital or otherwise, which
systematically function to increase the probability of upward mobility?
If there exists a sort of queue of secondary workers leading to primary 
14employment, then we might expect those secondary workers whose human 
capital endowments are marginally superior to the majority of the secon­
dary labor force to gain access, given the proper economic climate, to 
the primary labor market. In this case, we might expect to find signi­
ficant positive coefficients on graduation status, vocational training 
and potential labor force experience, all of which can be considered 
human capital variables.
A more strict interpretation of the mobility process would maintain 
that whatever mobility occurs is purely random, and none of the variables 
enumerated above should systematically explain intersectoral mobility.
The two labor markets are virtually separate, and operate under totally 
different sets of work rules appropriate to the different composition 
of the work force in each sector. Since the structure of the secondary 
market is inconducive to the development of primary work traits, and 
since the secondary work force is a homogeneous commodity, it follows 
that mobility will be practically nonexistent, occurring merely by chance.
Mobility may be explained in terms of a primary employer pointing 
and saying, "I'll take you, you and you," as he views a mass of undif­
ferentiated secondary laborers. Thus, we should not expect statistically 
significant positive coefficients on our vector of independent variables.
14Peter B. Doeringer and Michael Piore, Internal Labor Markets and 





The regression results for the earnings models are presented and 
discussed in this section. As noted in the previous chapter, the purpose 
of this model is to observe whether or not certain variables systemati­
cally influence annual earnings within and across the primary and secon­
dary labor markets. I begin by presenting the results for the runs on 
the two labor markets, starting with the primary market.
The regression results for the primary market earnings model are 
given in Table 1. As expected, earnings were found to vary systemati­
cally with respect to educational attainment (graduation status), potential
labor market experience, weeks worked and class of worker. The rather 
- 2
low R indicates that a substantial amount of the variation in earnings is
not explained in the context of the model. The correlation coefficient in
this model and in those that follow, however, does fall within the range of
those obtained in most earnings/labor market regression models.'*' Rather
than trying to augment the explanatory power of the model as a whole, I
feel it is more important to explain the economic importance of the included
variables. As M. Dutta points out, "...there is often misdirected emphasis
2 - 2on obtaining a high value of R (or R )...If the hypothesis based on a priori
1 2 For additional illustrations of the range of the R term in labor market
models, see the empirical sections in Andrisani, Bluestone, Osterman and
Rosenberg cited earlierj Also see the J.P.E. Vol.80, No.3, Part II, May/June
1972 cited in Osterman.
2
Paul Osterman, "An Empirical Model of Labor Market Segmentation" in 
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Significant at 0.005 level
2 - 2economic theory is adequately tested, a low value of R (or R ) is not 
so bad."^
The strong significant coefficient on HSG indicates that high school 
graduates fare considerably better in terms of earnings than non-graduates. 
The almost $4000 per year earnings differential attributable to graduation 
status tells us that within the primary sector the better paying jobs 
are reserved for those persons having at least a high school diploma. This 
finding provides additional support for the dualist contention that the 
"diploma effect" remains a strong entrance requirement for access to many 
primary labor market occupations.
Potential labor market experience was also found to be a significant 
explicator of primary market earnings. Assuming this variable measures the 
marginal returns to employment in an internal labor market, a worker's 
earnings increase systematically as he moves up through the ranks of his 
initial mobility cluster. These returns are undoubtedly reflected in 
institutionalized wage and salary and promotional opportunities common to 
internal labor markets, in addition to the effect of experience and on-the- 
job training on worker productivity.
Primary market workers employed in occupations in the primate sector 
had considerably higher earnings than their counterparts in public sector 
occupations. Given the relatively secure nature of higher level primary 
public sector occupations, it is possible that the significance of this 
variable serves to measure the extent of the trade-off between higher 
earnings (private sector) and greater job security (public sector).
Bennett Harrison notes there are important non-wage benefits uniquely 
associated with public employment, including virtually automatic tenure
3
M. Dutta, Econometric Methods (Cincinnati, Ohio: South Western 
Publishing Co., 1975), p.82.
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and secular job stability. One need not look too far into primary public 
sector employment (e.g., postal, civil service) to see the extent to which 
the internal structure of the labor market provides for job security and 
defined mechanisms for layoffs, promotions, pay scales, etc.
Earnings in the primary market were not significantly influenced by 
prior participation in a vocational training program. Caution should be 
taken as to the interpretation of this result, since the role of vocational 
training may be deemed more appropriate to the development of worker 
characteristics suitable to primary market employment. At the initial 
port of entry into a primary market occupation, those workers who have 
had vocational training may place higher on an employment queue than those 
without training. Once initial hiring decisions are made, however, the 
functioning of the internal mobility cluster takes over regarding pay 
increments. Thus it would be premature to make any definitive statements 
as to the function of vocational training in the context of dual labor 
theory.
The overall results of the primary market regression model substan­
tiate many of the basic propositions of segmented labor market theory.
This is not to say, however, that the results refute the human capital 
school. That primary market earnings were found to vary systematically 
according to a worker's stock of human capital should not surprise either 
the dualists or the human capital theorists.
If we put our regression model in fuctional form 
EARN = f(Human Capital, Weeks Worked, Class) 
and differentiate earnings with respect to human capital, i.e., 9Earn/8H.C.,
4
Bennett Harrison, "Public Sector Jobs and the Disadvantaged" in 
Manpower and Employment: A Source Book for Social Workers, ed. Margaret
Purvine (New York: Council on Social Work Education, Inc., 1972), p.47.
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the partial will be greater than zero. This result, f' _ >0, is basic
ri • L .
to traditional theory. It is also consistent with dual theory, providing 
we restrict the analysis to the primary labor market. Although causation 
and methodologies may differ, once a worker finds himself in the primary 
labor market, the rival theories stand in basic agreement as to the pre­
dicted returns to human capital factors.
When the focus is shifted to the secondary labor market, the expected 
returns from increasing a worker's stock of human capital differ consi­
derably. Not recognizing the existence of segmented labor markets, the 
human capital theorists claim 8Earn/3H.C.>0 for all workers, while the
dualists maintain in the secondary market f' =0. Since this distinction
n  • C* •
is vital in comparing the two theories, I will now discuss the empirical
findings for the secondary market, paying close attention to the effect of
human capital on worker earnings.
The regression results for the secondary sector earnings regression
are presented in Table 2. For persons employed at secondary market jobs,
only weeks worked exerted any systematic influence on earnings. None of
the other variables proved to be significant determinants of earnings.
_2
The R term was lower in this model than in the preceding one, indi­
cating a somewhat greater degree of randomness in the earnings determina­
tion process in the secondary sector. Finding greater randomness in 
earnings determination in the secondary sector is supportive of the dual 
labor theory, in that individual worker characteristics are claimed to 
have no systematic influence on earnings. Since wages are uniformly low 
throughout the secondary sector and an abundant supply of labor power is 
readily available, factors which are conventionally used to explain varia­
tion in earnings fail to do so. Osterman also found that the explanatory 
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comparability is difficult, since he subdivided the primary labor market
into an upper and lower tier.'* Andrisani's wage determination model, on
the other hand, experienced a sharp decline in explanatory power for runs
on the primary sector as opposed to the secondary sector. In fact, the 
2
adjusted R for his primary whites-only model (the one most comparable to
_2
that used here) was only slightly more than half the R attained in the 
£
secondary market. According to Andrisani's model, worker differences are 
important in explaining earnings determination in the secondary labor 
market. Thus, in terms of correlation coefficients, the results obtained 
here, along with Osterman's, are more supportive of dual labor theory than 
those obtained by Andrisani.
That none of the human capital variables turned out to be signifi­
cant with respect to earnings lends still further credence to dual labor 
market analysis. A basic proposition of the dual theory is that within 
the secondary market, employers do not distinguish between workers with 
respect to age, race, sex, etc. The relations of production in the 
secondary sector are such that educational status, years in the labor 
force and vocational training do not increase worker productivity, and as 
a result are uncorrelated with earnings. Labor power is, in fact, viewed 
as a homogeneous commodity, in that all workers look alike to the secon­
dary employer and are readily interchangable.
Given the severe test conditions under which this model was estimated 
(i.e., tight labor market period, no racial distinctions, etc.), it is 
surprising to find results even more supportive of strict dual theory than 
in some earlier empirical endeavors. Andrisani, for example, found that in
O^sterman. p.518.
£
Paul James Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor Market 
Theory (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.82.
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both sectors, dropping out of school(not graduating high school) had an 
adverse effect on wage rates, while age, used as a proxy for labor market 
exposure, significantly contributed to earnings.7 These results are men­
tioned because they are supportive of the competing human capital queue 
theory of the labor market, while my results refute the traditional theory. 
Potential labor market experience did not serve to increase secondary 
earnings. Since most secondary jobs take very little time to learn and 
once learned worker prodictivity plateaus, there is no need for any sort 
of continuing on-the-job training programs. Furthermore, given the 
absence of internal labor markets in secondary jobs, no institutionalized 
mechanisms exist which specify earnings increment, promotional oppor­
tunities and/or collective bargaining agreements. The employer is simply 
indifferent with respect to the age composition of his work force. Since 
training programs are virtually nonexistent, and since years in the labor 
force do not systematically increase earnings, workers in secondary jobs 
receive the same income regardless of experience (age). Thus, an experience/ 
earnings profile for secondary labor market workers in New England would 
take the following form:
Earnings
Experience, Years in Labor Force 
Neither participation in a vocational training program nor employment 
in the private sector contributed to earnings in the secondary market.
Both of these results are consistent with dual labor theory in that (a) the 
nature of secondary jobs renders vocational preparation superfluous,
7Ibid. p.81.
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(b) earnings are uniformly low for all secondary jobs, and (c) the secondary 
labor process does not distinguish public sector low wage, skill level, 
etc., occupations from those located in the private sector.
As stated above, only weeks worked was found to be a significant 
explicator of earnings. David Gordon's contention that in the "secondary 
market individual income will depend primarily on the (amount of time) 
worked while variations in individual earnings will depend very little on
g
variations in individual capacities..." is strongly substantiated, given 
the results of the present model.
Probability of Primary Employment Model
The results of the probability of primary labor market employment model
are given in Tables 3 and 4. As discussed in the previous chapter, this is
a two equation model of the form:
7
y, = a +£ a.x.+ u1 o . , x xx=l
7
Y„ = a + Z a.x. + ao0ccup-r + u2 o . , x x 8 65x=l
where the estimated value of the dependent variable (y) is interpreted as 
the conditional probability of employment in the primary labor market. The 
x/s are defined as a vector of human capital variables, the purpose of
which is to determine the extent to which these variables explain a worker's
current labor market standing. In the second equation, sector of employment 
(primary or secondary) five years ago is added to the human capital variables, 
in order to test the dual hypothesis that a worker's earlier labor market
g
David M. Gordon, Theories of Poverty and Underemployment (Lexington, 
Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1972), p.51.
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standing should serve to predict the sector in which the worker is currently 
employed.
So that I may avoid repeated use of the somewhat cumbersome titles 
given to the above models, the first will be referred to as the "current" 
model while the second one (which includes Occup^ ,.) will simply be called 
the "augmented" model. I will begin by discussing the results of the 
current model, and then compare them with the estimates derived from the 
augmented model.
_2
The coefficient of correlation (R adj) for the current model turned out 
to be quite low (only 4.6 percent), indicating that factors not captured in 
the model may account for a sizable amount of the variation in the depen­
dent variable. Nevertheless, two of the independent variables, graduation 
status and vocational training, were found to systematically affect the 
probability of employment in the primary market. A one tail T test on
these two variables revealed them to be different from zero at the 0.005
9
level of significance.
From Table 3, it can be seen that the probability of securing a job 
in the primary labor market is significantly greater for high school 
graduates than for drop outs. Although it may be argued that at least a 
high school diploma is a necessary prerequisite for many primary market 
occupations, this is clearly not the case for all occupations which have 
been classified as primary occupations.^
9
One tail T tests were used since the hypothesis tested is that gradu­
ation status and vocational training are positively associated with the 
chances of primary market employment.
10
A series of tables which list the census Classified Index of Occupa­
tions and estimates of required general educational development can be . 
found in James Scoville, The Job Content of the U.S. Economy 1940-1970. 
Inspection of these tables shows the vast majority of occupations require 
less than 12 years of schooling.
11
James G. Scoville, The Job Content of the U.S. Economy 1940-1970 
(New York: McGraw Hill Book Co., 1969), p.30.
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Significant at 0.005 level
Access to the primary market is strongly influenced by graduation status,
indicating that the diploma remains an important credentialing device used
by employers in their hiring decisions. This supports segmentation theory,
in that the use of educational credentials provides a quick and allegedly
12inexpensive device for screening out socially undesirable individuals.
Since a major function of the educational system is to teach future workers 
how to behave and fit into the production process, employers, by screening 
out high school dropouts, ensure themselves of a stable "well" conditioned 
work force.^
Participation in a vocational training program was also found to 
increase the likelihood of employement in the primary labor market. Voca­
tional training programs, in addition to teaching (hopefully) marketable 
skills, stress behavioral modifications (such as punctuality) deemed neces­
sary prerequisites for employment in primary occupations, but of no value in 
the secondary market, given the structure and nature of employment therein. 
Although statistically significant, this result should not be used to throw 
whole-hearted support to the structure of vocational training programs in 
New England. Enrollment in a training program only increased the probability 
of primary employment by approximately six and one-half percent. In this 
light, I would recommend a cost/benefit analysis of vocational training pro­
grams in the New England area to see whether or not this six and one-half 
percent increase in the probability of primary employment justifies main­
taining existing training programs.
12
Bennett Harrison, Education, Training and the Urban Ghetto (Baltimore: 
The John Hopkins Press, 1972), p.30.
13
See S. Bowles and H. Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America for a 
detailed discussion of the role of education in the labor process.
Neither marital status nor employment in the private sector served to 
increase a worker's chances of gaining access to a primary market occupation. 
Finding marital status insignificant forces me to question Piore's hypothesis 
that marriage and family formation increases a worker's stability, thereby 
making him more condusive to employment in the primary sector. A word of 
caution is in order, in that this result may be attributed more to the fact 
that the New England model is not restricted to urban labor markets where 
the "street corner lifestyle" prohibits both stable marriage and the develop­
ment of work characteristics, thereby trapping workers in the secondary 
14labor market. It may well be the case that in non-urban labor markets, 
secondary workers exhibit stable marital patterns even though secondary job 
structures do not provide much stability.
The likelihood of employment in the primary labor market did not vary 
systematically with labor market experience. Workers with limited market 
exposure were just as likely to be in the primary market as were workers who 
had been in the labor market for upwards of twenty years. This supports 
the hypothesized relationship between experience and probability of primary 
employment, in that workers whose market exposure has been in the secondary 
sector are not provided with increases in productive abilities which would 
act to increase their chances of gaining a slot in the primary sector. For 
workers whose PLFE has been in the primary market, experience, as the results 
of the first model indicate, increases income via the institutionalized 
structure of the internal labor market.
Turning to the "augmented" model, (Table 4) we find that the inclusion 
of Occupg^  results in a sharp reduction of the unexplained variance and





















Significant at 0.005 level
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consequently, a much higher coefficient of correlation. Occup^ exerts 
a positive significant effect on current market standing, accounting for 
more than half the conditional probability of employment in the primary 
labor market. The importance of labor market status five years ago as a 
determinant of current status suggests the viability of the dualist position 
that once a person finds himself in the primary (secondary) labor market, 
he will more than likely spend the remainder of his working career in the 
primary (secondary) labor market.
Graduation status and vocational training were also significant expli- 
cators of primary employment in the augmented model. However, the relative 
importance of these two variables declined in the latter model. Graduation 
from high school increased the probability of primary employment by ten 
and one-half percent in the current model, but only by four and six-tenths 
percent in the augmented model; whereas participation in a vocational train­
ing program increased the likelihood of primary employment six and seven- 
tenths percent in the first model, but only three and one-half percent in 
the second. This suggests there may be interaction between Occup^ ,. and one 
or more of the remaining independent variables included in the model.
In order to test for the existence and severity of multicollinearity,
I used a test developed by D. E. Farrar and R. R. Glauber.M. Dutta
explains the test as follows:
...estimate the multiple correlation coefficient 
of a particular independent variable, x^ > with 
respect to all other members of the x set and 
denote this by To test whether x is seriously
collinear with the other X's, form the ratio:
^D, E. Farrar and R. R. Glauber, "Multicollinearity in Regression 
Analysis: The Problem Revisited" in Review of Economics and Statistics





where R is the correlation coefficient as estimated for 
the multiple regreggion.^
Regressing Occupy against the remaining x's yielded an Rx^ of 0.044.
Forming the required ratio:
Rx,
= 0.044/0.346 < 1R
y
we see that multicollinearity is not a serious problem. Thus, Occup^ 
exerts a strong independent influence on current labor market standing.
Mobility Model
The regression results for the probability of upward mobility model 
are given in Table 5. This model is a dichotomous dependent variable 
model of the form:
7
y = a + £ a.x. + u 
o . . 1 1
i=l
where y takes on a value of one if the respondent was employed in the
secondary labor market in 1965 and in the primary market in 1970, and a
value of zero if he was in the secondary market in 1965 and 1970. The
x^ 's were defined as a vector of human capital and control variables.
2
As in the previous models, the adjusted R is somewhat low; only 
ten and six-tenths percent of the variation in mobility is explained by 
the independent variables. However, several of the independent variables 
do exert a systematic influence on the likelihood of upward mobility. In 
addition, the computed F statistic is greater than the critical value 
(fj -].61^ ’ so t*iat we can re3ect null hypothesis that a^  = a^  = 0.
Graduation status did not turn out to be a significant explicator of 




















significant at 0.005 level 
s^ignificant at 0.01 level
c
significant at 0.05 level
upwardly mobile than were nongraduates. This result is particularly 
damaging to traditional/human capital theory, since proponents of orthodox 
theory have continually stressed the role of formal education as a means 
by which workers can escape from the confines of low paying, low status 
secondary type jobs. Finding graduation status insignificant, on the 
other hand, suggests the viability of the dualist position that secondary 
workers are "locked into" their low level positions, and increasing human 
capital endowments of these workers will not serve to increase their 
chances of upward labor market mobility.
Although the coefficient on HSG does lend itself to an interpretation 
favorable to segmented labor market theory, a word or two of caution is in 
order. As explained earlier, the data only accounts for mobility between 
1965 and 1970. Since the respondents completed their formal education 
prior to 1965, there is no way to ascertain the function of formal educa­
tion in the distribution of first job selection. It may well be the case 
that educational attainment figures decisively in the determination process 
on the basis of the results obtained here.
Turning to vocational training, we find participation in a vocational 
training program does act to increase the probability of upward mobility.
A one tail T test shows the coefficient on VocT to be significant at the 
0.05 level. Hence, a worker in the secondary sector in 1965 who has had 
some formal training is almost fifteen percent more likely to be upwardly 
mobile than a similarly situated worker with no vocational training. This 
result, in contrast to that for education, is at odds with dual theory and 
supportive of the rival human capital theory. According to the dualists, 
the relations of production in the secondary labor market are inconducive 
to vocational training, i.e., the jobs do not require it and workers do not 
receive any monetary returns from it. Thus, workers in the secondary market
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should have no incentive to undertake vocational training if it doesn't 
result in monetary payoffs and if they believe they don't have access to 
primary jobs. The human capital school, in contrast, argues that vocational 
training increases the primary "employability" of secondary workers. In 
addition to teaching a primary marketable skill, vocational training pro­
grams also expose workers to the rigor and behavioral characteristics 
deemed prerequisites to entrance into a primary market occupation. As a 
consequence of such training and exposure, those in the program move 
upward on the employment queue, thereby gaining access to the primary 
market. Quite simply, vocational training differentiates secondary workers, 
increasing their productivity and desirability to primary employers.
The results obtained here tend to substantiate the latter approach to 
the role of training programs. Although this appears on the surface to 
conflict with the results obtained elsewhere which favor a dualist inter­
pretation, it should be tempered by the realization that VocT was, at best, 
marginally significant. Looking at the model was a whole, it is safe to 
say that the mobility process is marked by a sizable amount of randomness 
and it is difficult to make any precise statements as to what, if any, 
factors serve to explain intersectoral mobility.
Several additional comments on the coefficients on this model are in 
order. The coefficient on E3 (30 or more years of experience) turned out 
to be significant at the 0.005 level. This is interesting, in that it 
denotes a strong inverse relationship between years in the secondary labor 
market and the probability of upward mobility. This strongly favors our 
hypothesized relation between experience and mobility, in that the longer 
a person has been subjected to the unstructured relations of production in 
the secondary market, the more ingrained the "negative" behavioral traits 
associated therein become. The continued exposure to secondary working
conditions thus reduces the likelihood of a worker escaping these con­
fines and getting a primary job. The significant negative coefficient on E3 
simply indicates that the chances of mobility diminish over time.
In order to further test the inverse relationship between chances of 
mobility and years in the labor force, the model was run a second time 
with experience as a continuous variable. The results were similar to those 
in Table 5 (VocT significant at 0.05, HSG, Class, etc., insignificant), 
except now the coefficient on experience equals -0.015 and tested signifi­
cant at the 0.005 level. This is interesting, in that it tells us that a 
secondary worker's chances of upward mobility decline by one and one-half 
percent each year he is in the secondary labor market.
An overall evaluation of the mobility model raises several important
questions and problems. Some of the coefficients suggest the viability
of segmented labor market theory, while others support traditional theory.
That the mobility process is marked by a substantial amount of randomness,
and that educational attainment does not increase the probability of upward
17mobility can be readily interpreted from a dualist perspective. On the 
other hand, the data indicate that mobility takes place to an extent that 
renders a strict interpretation of dual theory (market boundaries are vir­
tually impenetrable) a severe set back. In fact, of those persons whose 
reported 1965 occupation was classified as secondary, better than one- 
third reported 1970 occupations which were in the primary labor market. I 
am at a loss to provide a satisfactory explanation for the mobility that 
does take place. This indicates that (1) factors endemic to the data make
17The basic mobility model was respecified using education as a 
continuous variable. It still turned out not to be significant with 
respect to mobility.
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accounting for mobility impossible or (2) despite the estent of mobility, 
it remains truly "an accident" of chance, e.g., being in the right place 
at the right time. Perhaps the best explanation is that 1965 to 1970 was 
an historical period of rapid G.N.P. growth, falling unemployment rates and 
the induction of thousands of young men into the military.
This concludes the empirical chapters of my thesis. In the following 
chapters the emphasis shifts from econometric models to a case study of the 
labor market in Manchester, New Hampshire. The purpose of the case study 
is to gather direct evidence concerning the extent to which internal labor 
markets function in the state's largest and most industrious city. The 
results of the case study will then be used in conjunction with the empirical 
findings, in order to gain a clearer understanding of the labor market seg­
mentation process in New England.
CHAPTER VI
CASE STUDY: THE MANCHESTER LABOR MARKET
In this chapter, I present the results of a case study of the labor 
market in Manchester, New Hampshire. Through the cooperation of the 
Center for Industrial and Institutional Development (CUD) of the 
Whittemore School of Business and Economics and the Manchester Industrial 
Council, I was able to gain access to several of the city's largest foot­
wear, electronics and textile producing companies. These industries were 
selected partly because represent two cases (textile and shoe) of what 
may be called declining industries, and one (electronics) which is a 
growth industry. Furthermore, in terms of employment these are the three 
largest manufacturing industries in Manchester. Total employment in the 
three from 1970-1975 is given in Table 6. Despite the severe downturn 
in electronics employment during the 1975 recession, state projections 
indicate "the primary sources of new jobs in durable goods manufacturing 
from 1974-1985...should be electrical machinery products industries. One 
out of every five projected new jobs for the Manchester SMSA will be in 
this electrical machiner sector."'*' The declines in the other two sectors 
are expected to continue through the 1980's.
In order to find information concerning the structure of the labor 
market from which these industries draw their manpower, a two-part, semi­
open ended questionnaire was developed. Managerial personnel, primarily
New Hampshire Department of Employment Security. Occupational 
Projections to 1985 Manchester S.M.S.A. (prepared by Economic Analysis 




Employment by Industrial Group, Manchester, N. H. 
(Annual Averages)
Leather and
Electrical Textile Leather Products
1970 3,350 2,800 4,900
1971 3,600 3,000 4,600
1972 4,050 3,300 4,350
1973 4,800 3,200 3,500
1974 4,950 2,900 3,000
1975 4,100 1,800 2,850
SOURCE: New Hampshire Department of Employment Security.
Occupational Prolections to 1985; Manchester, 
N.H., SMSA, June, 1977, p.2.
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personnel directors, were interviewed and asked questions concerning (a) 
the composition of their labor force, (b) recruitment procedures, (c) the 
provisions the company has for worker training, (d) the existence of 
avenues of in-firm worker mobility and (e) separation and turnover rates. 
The second part of the questionnaire was administered to production workers 
in each of the companies visited. Workers were asked (a) how long they had 
been with the company, (b) whether or not they had participated in training 
programs, (c) if their current job was different from the one they were 
initially hired to perform, (d) the frequency with which they received 
either pay increases or promotions, and (e) several questions concerning 
their pre-employment history and family background. Questionnaires were 
given to four personnel directors, one vice-president, and approximately 
forty wrokers in five companies: two footwear, two electronics, and one
textile. See Appendix 2 for copies of the questionnaires.
The intent of this survey was to see if management and labor responses 
suggest segmentation within the Manchester labor market. It will be 
recalled from Chapter 2 that employment conditions in the secondary labor 
market differ considerably from those in the primary market. It was also 
pointed out that many dualists believe the existence of an internal labor 
market with structured mechanisms for the administration of work rules, 
seniority, promotions and layoffs, all of which serve to isolate workers 
from external market forces, signifies that the occupation is in the pri­
mary labor market. With this in mind, the extent to which we can find 
developed internal labor markets in the industries studied may give an 
indication as to whether or not the occupations therein are in the primary 
labor market.
The methodology I use for reporting observations is as follows: For
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each of the three industries studied, I first present some observations 
based upon discussions with management, and then present observations based 
upon worker discussions. The industries are discussed separately in order 
to get as complete a picture as possible of the labor process in each 
industry, and also to see if there is any conflict between management’s 
responses and those of production workers. I begin with the footwear 
industry, followed by the electronics and textile industries. The chapter 
concludes with an attempt to synthesize the occupational and industrial 




According to the personnel directors interviewed, the labor supply 
for the footwear industry is drawn from the local labor market, i.e., 
Manchester and the surrounding area. A large part of the labor force in one 
company was said to come from the French Canadian district of the city, 
which was within walking distance of the plant. When recruiting workers, 
the companies tended to rely upon three major sources: walk-ins, word of
mounth (employee referrals), and the local media (newspaper want ads and 
radio spots). Given the unstructured nature of the hiring sources, it 
follows that hirees were not subjected to an extensive pre-employment 
screening process. I was told on numerous occasions there were no standard 
requirements on which hiring decisions were made. Education was not con­
sidered an important factor, since most of the jobs required medium to low 
skill levels. One personnel manager went so far as to describe his labor 
force as comprising "the low end of the. labor market."
Formal, in-house worker training programs were virtually nonexistent
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in any of the footwear plants visited. Whatever training a new worker 
received was attained informally, usually watching someone performing the 
job, being shown the basic techniques, and then beginning the job. Since, 
in some cases, payment was by piece-work, it was to the employee's advan­
tage to start on the job quickly in order to develop speed. Management 
argued a more extensive training program was really unnecessary, because 
most of the jobs required only a short period of time to be learned.
In response to questions concerning avenues of in-firm upward mobility, 
personnel directors indicated there were no formal job ladders for pro­
duction workers operating in their organizations. Although most workers 
were hired into entry level positions and were said to receive periodic 
pay increases (especially in unionized plants), workers generally remained 
at the job they were initially hired to perform. In one case, I was told 
that openings in the factory were posted and workers could bid for the
open job. Whereas Doeringer and Piore consider "bidding and posting" as
2
factors in an internal market structure, in the present case, relatively 
few workers were said to take advantage of bidding. Those that did seemed 
to move horizontally, just to try something different from their current 
job. One manager commented that significant upward mobility was rare, but 
a possible line of progression might take the form: bell boy (assistant
to a machinist), machinist, department manager, factory manager.
Upper level job slots were said to be almost always filled by going 
out into the external labor market. The impression was given that 
"insiders" were simply not managerial or supervisory material. One company 
reported to have tried an in-house pre-supervisory training program, but found
2
Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore. Internal Labor Markets and 
Manpower Analysis. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971),
p.55.
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internal promotion to be ineffective: "Standards were below par". The
company concluded that in order to maintain an acceptable rate of growth, 
hiring at mid-level positions and above must be done externally. In all 
cases, upper level positions were said to require academic training. 
Obviously, this tends to limit that range of opportunities available to 
production workers.
Turnover rates were reported to be in excess of 100 percent per year 
in all firms visited. Although management voiced concern about such a 
high rate of turnover, I was told that this was common to this type of 
industry. Turnover was mostly due to workers quitting their jobs. No 
formal exit interviews were conducted, but the major reasons given for 
quitting included: a different (better?) job which either paid slightly
better or had better working conditions, and morale problems such as not 
being able to get along with the foreman, supervisor, or co-workers.
None of the personnel directors indicated that their company was planning 
to do anything to try to curb the amount of labor turnover.
Worker Responses
Interviews with production workers substantiated most of what
management said regarding the structure and organization of work in this
industry. Employees interviewed included lining cutters, stitchers,
casers, assemblers and nailers. Although it was clear that a detailed
division of labor exists in the shoe industry, the differences in the jobs
appeared minimal. Then cross referenced with the Dictionary of Occupational
Titles, most of the jobs fell in the first and second General Education




G.E.D. level 2 entails applying common sense understanding to carry 
out detailed but uninvolved written or oral instructions and svp level 3
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With very few exceptions, workers were on the same job in which 
they initially started employment. Those who had "moved around" within 
the company appeared to have performed the same type of work, but on 
different machines. There was no evidence of an internal labor market. 
Workers did say that they had received periodic pay increases, so that 
other things being equal, workers with "seniority" earned more than 
recent hirees performing the same job. Since most workers said they 
were paid on a piecework basis, incomes, for the most part, depended on 
how fast the worker could perform his/her job.
When asked if they had undertaken any formal or informal on-the-job 
training since beginning employment, close to sixty percent responded 
"no". Upon further questioning of the "yes" respondents, all admitted 
that the extent of their "training" was: "Following a person around to
learn the ropes", "supervisor saying things", or watching an experienced 
worker. Given the extent and nature of training, it was not surprising 
to hear workers say that their training did not lead to either pay in­
creases or promotions.
Despite the fact that half of the workers interviewed said they had 
less than twelve years of schooling, more than eighty percent felt their 
current job did not require the educational background they had. There 
was little evidence of intergenerational upward mobility among footwear 
workers. Of those who remembered, none of their fathers had graduated 
from high school, and three-fourths said their father had little more than 
a grammar school education. Furthermore, of the ninety percent who grew
4
includes up to three months of training.
4
U.S. Department of Labor. Selected Characteristics of Occupations,
A Supplement to the D.O.T., 3rd Edition. (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1966), pp. A-5, A-6.
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up in New Hampshire, most said their fathers were employed as shoe and 
mill workers in the Manchester area.
Electronics
Management Responses
Recruitment of personnel in the electronics industry operates 
on what can be considered a two-tiered system. Professional and "high 
technology" employees are recruited from the national labor market 
drawing manpower from Boston, New York, Chicago, etc. This is considered 
by management to constitute a separate labor market. These employees 
were not covered in this survey since my concern is with production level 
workers. For the second tier, assemblers and other production workers, 
hiring is usually confined to the greater Manchester labor market.
Oftentimes, recent arrivals to the Manchester area were said to seek 
employment in electronics firms. Aware that electronics is Manchester's 
fastest growing industrial sector, personnel directors noted that other 
electronics companies were their major source of competition for workers.
In previous years, it was argued, there really was not much competition 
for employees, but now employees are aware of wage and benefit packages 
of competing firms.
Most of the hiring was said to be done by means of newspaper want 
ads, although some indicated they hire from employment security offices,
W.I.N., C.E.T.A. and referrals from current employees. Hiring decisions 
appeared to be somewhat more structured than in the footwear industry.
References were frequently requested and, in some cases, closely checked. 
Education levels were looked at but were said not to constitute a basis 
for hiring. It did seem that employers had a preference for high school 
graduates and that a screening process operated in entry level hiring decisions.
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All companies reported that in-house worker training programs exist. 
However, the extent of the training programs differed quite widely from 
plant to plant. One personnel director stated O.J.T. was simply placing 
a new worker with a senior employee. The senior employee functions as a 
group leader, demonstrating whatever techniques hirees need to learn. 
Another director elaborated a more detailed in-house training program, 
which included a "one week cram program" for assemblers, a machinist 
training program, and a series of in-house vestibule schools for learning 
soldering and other assembly-related techniques. Depending upon the 
situation, responsibility for training rested on the group leader, the 
machine shop supervisor, or the assembler trainer, a person whose job 
is to train assembly workers. Two company representatives stated that 
their firm would pay a part of any work-related outside education an 
employee undertakes.
Hourly workers were initially hired into entry-level positions as 
either assemblers or machinists. There was some indication of a structured 
job sequence in the companies visited. The degree of market internaliza­
tion differed and was found to depend, in part, on whether or not the 
company was unionized. Management in a unionized firm argued that union 
influence hindered worker mobility, because the union traps employees into 
positions and pay scales as specified in the union contract. The union 
agreement establishes pay increases, seniority and so forth, but makes 
promotion out of specified job classifications based upon ability difficult. 
In a non-unionized firm, promotion decisions were said to be left up to 
the worker’s immediate supervisor. I was told that the relevant promotion 
criteria Included attendance, punctuality, attitude, quality of work, 
supervisor’s opinion, and seniority.
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Several different lines of promotion existed, indicating the presence 
of internal labor markets in the electronics companies visited. In one 
firm, promotion was from assembly jobs into light clerical. An example 




Except for top level positions, those above manager's secretary, every 
open job slot was said to be posted and filled from within if at all 
possible.
In another firm, there appeared to be a more structured internal 
labor market. Promotion levels were more sharply defined and confined 
within the production sphere as indicated:
Supervisory level 
Group leader
Skilled production assembler 
Production assembler 
Entry trainee
Each upward step was considered a promotion and was said to entail an 
increase in pay. As in the previous case, upper level slots were filled 
from within, but promotion was based upon selection, as opposed to 
bidding and posting.
No specifics were given with regard to the incidence of turnover. 
However, rates were said to be lower in the unionized firms than in non- 
unionized establishments. On the whole, management did not feel turnover 
to be a serious problem. No formal exit interviews were conducted with
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departing employees, but personnel directors indicated that workers who 
leave usually go to another electronics firm that may pay slightly more 
or offer more nonwage benefits.
Worker Responses
Most of the people interviewed were working as assemblers.
However, the nature of the assembly work differed considerably from plant 
to plant. In one company, assemblers built each unit from start to finish 
(similar to the Volvo production format) while in another, each assembler 
only performed a specific task (stuff circuit board with components, 
cable assembler, solderer). In response to questions concerning what they 
liked best about their jobs, several people in the former said they liked, 
"building units from start to finish", "found it challenging", and "got 
satisfaction out of seeing a finished product". In the latter, the 
responses were more along the lines of, "I like the people", "it's a nice 
place to work", or quite simply, "everything".
Other workers interviewed included quality control inspectors, pres­
sure calibrators, and floor supervisors. In all cases, these people 
started out in entry level positions (assembly) and were promoted from 
within the organization. Although such in-firm upward mobility did indi­
cate an internal job allocation process, it appeared that many workers 
were not upwardly mobile and were more or less locked into assembly level 
positions. In some cases, assemblers moved about from line to line, since 
some assembly lines were claimed to be more attractive than others. It 
was not possible to determine whether or not there was an occupational 
hierarchy among assemblers, or what factors determined which assembly station 
a worker was assigned to. There was, however, a greater sense of job 
attachment among electronics workers than in the footwear industry.
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Better than eighty percent of the workers Interviewed indicated that 
they had received some formal or informal on-the-job training since they 
began working. Of these, approximately sixty percent stated they had 
participated in formal, company-run or sponsored training programs, such 
as soldering school. Upon completion of soldering school, workers noted 
they were given a "certificate" indicating successful completion of the 
course.
In one company, when asked if this training resulted in pay increases 
and/or promotions, the uniform response was "no". This was somewhat 
surprising since, according to traditional economic theory, training 
increases a worker's human capital, thereby raising his/her marginal pro­
ductivity and hence wages. Management's response was that the union 
contract specifies pay scales and positions, and as a result rules out 
promotions based upon performance and ability. Employees receive periodic 
pay increases and seniority rights, but these accrue independent of par­
ticipation in formal training programs.
Close to seventy-five percent of the electronics workers interviewed 
had at least a high school diploma. All of the employees who had moved out 
of assembly level job slots came from this group. Perhaps this indicates 
that although management does not necessarily make a high school diploma 
a prerequisite for employment, the diploma greatly enhances the probability 
of upward in-firm mobility. Also, slightly more than half the sample said 
they felt their job required the educational background they possessed.
Workers in the electronics industry tended to come from a somewhat 
higher socio-economic strata than their counterparts in the footwear 
industry, The education level of their parents was found to be considerably 
higher than in the shoe industry, in that only forty percent reported that 
their fathers did not attend high school, while forty percent said their
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fathers had at least graduated from high school. Their fathers' occupa­
tions were, for the most part, lower level primary sector: construction,
electronics, sales and retail operators. Almost half indicated that they 
did not grow up in New Hampshire.
Textile Industry
Management Responses
As in the previous two cases, most of the production workers 
resided in Manchester and the surrounding community. Hiring sources were 
more varied than in the shoe and electronics industries. In addition to 
worker referrals, local media, and employment security agencies, a com­
pany spokesperson said that if a mill closes somewhere in New England or 
Northeastern Canada, they attempt to recruit workers who have recently 
lost their jobs.
There did not appear to be an extensive screening process for entry 
into the textile industry. Although the preceding paragraph indicates that 
companies will, at times, seek out experienced personnel, no specific men­
tion was made of either previous experience or educational prerequisites 
for employment. Pre-employment physicals were said to be given.
Of the three industries surveyed, textiles seemed to have the most 
formalized new worker training procedures. Entry level employees were 
said to receive a two-week training program conducted in a vestibule 
school. Successful completion of the program indicated that the worker 
was ready to move into a higher level job slot, i.e., entry into a well 
defined internal labor market. Above entry level, training was more 
informal and took place on the job. Usually a senior employee would show 
the worker "the ropes".
Virtually all production hourly workers were hired into entry level
positions. Once in an entry level slot, workers received training which 
enabled them to move into the next rung on the job ladder. Although it 
was not made clear who was generally responsible for making promotion 
decisions, I was informed that the most important factors influencing 
promotion decisions included the "ability to keep up" and learn the re­
quired techniques of operating the weaving machinery. Within the "weaving 
room" internal labor market, vacancies in upper level job slots were filled 
solely by moving workers from the job category immediately preceding the 
one in which the vacancy opened. The internal job allocation structure in 








Unifil tender (entry level)
Each upward step was considered a promotion and entailed an increase in pay. 
From unifil tender to fixer there was an approximate pay differential of 
fifty cents per hour for each step upward.
Despite the well-defined internal structure of the labor market, 
management indicated the turnover rate was high, and felt it to be a 
serious problem. Since the average length of employment of the workers I 
spoke with was close to thirty years, it seems likely that turnover is 
concentrated among younger workers in either entry or low level positions. 
Workers who terminate their employment usually do so because of higher
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pay and/or better working conditions elsewhere.
Worker Responses
The sample consisted of workers performing various tasks in 
what was called the "weave room". As mentioned above, the average dura­
tion of employment was upwards of thirty years. Thus, none of the inter­
viewees were in entry level positions. Although this may bias the sample 
by making employment in the textile industry appear more stable than it 
actually is, it did provide me with an excellent opportunity to observe 
the functioning of an internal labor market.
Most of the workers indicated that they had received some combina­
tion of formal training and on-the-job training. The major emphasis was 
on learning by simply watching a more experienced employee performing his/ 
her job. Since this type of training was deemed a necessary preprequisite 
for mobility, the few who said they had not received any training were 
probably discounting learning by watching as a form of training. In all 
cases, those who had received training said their training resulted in both 
pay increases and promotions. Most employees indicated they received pay 
increases when they moved up in rank, as well as increases guaranteed in 
their union contract. This is obviously quite different from the unionized 
electronics firm where employees stated they received no pecuniary rewards 
from undertaking training programs.
Management's depiction of the internal job structure was well docu­
mented in the worker interviews. Virtually all workers began their careers 
in what, at the time, were entry level positions. Due to modernization, 
some of the job categories in which workers started employment no longer 
exist. Nevertheless, as the examples below indicate, a great deal of 
similarity exists in the mobility patterns of the workers interviewed.
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When asked to enumerate the different jobs they had had since they began 
working for the company, several workers responded as follows:
Worker # 1 Worker it 2 Worker it 3
Current
Position: Loom fixer Unifil fixer
Changer Changer Changer
Weaver Knot tier Weaver
Battery handler Leaser Cloth boy





Each worker reported that each upward step entailed a salary increase and 
was considered a promotion. According to wage rate information that was 
made available to me, fixers earned about $4.50 per hour, changers $4.00 
per hour, and weavers $3.90 per hour. The examples given here are quite 
similar to those described by Doeringer and Piore as "closed internal 
markets" wherein "all jobs are filled internally through transfer or 
upgrading from a single entry job classification".^
In terms of both their educational background and that of their 
parents, textile workers were far more similar to footwear workers than 
to electronics workers. Very few textile workers where high school 
graduates. In fact, sixty percent of those questioned indicated that 
they had never attended high school. Their fathers, on the average, had 
even less formal education. It was interesting to find that better than 
sixty percent of those currently working in textile factories came from 





In this section, I will synthesize the occupational and labor market 
information gathered in the interviews with the dual labor market theory.
As we shall see, this raises several important problems, as there was no 
clear-cut, one-to-one correspondence between the characteristics of employ­
ment in any one firm and the basic postulates of dual theory. Dual 
theorists argue that employment conditions in secondary labor markets are 
characterized by high turnover, low pay, almost no opportunity for in-firm 
occupational advancement, arbitrary managerial control and a general 
environment which is unconducive to the formation of stable employment 
relationships. A corollary to these characteristics is that industries 
where these work relationships predominate are low wage industries, i.e., 
denoted by low profit margins and situated in competitive product and 
factor markets. Primary market jobs pay higher wages, are more stable 
(lower turnover), oftentimes are unionized, and are characterized by the 
presence of an internal labor market. Employers are generally more 
restrictive in their hiring policies and usually provide for specific 
training for workers.
Table 7 presents a summary of the employment conditions in each of 
the three industrial sectors: Footwear, Electronics and Textiles. It
appears that in some industries, despite unstructured and informal recruit­
ment procedures, relatively short training programs, and high turnover, 
a well-developed internal labor market operates. This was especially true 
in the textile industry. Prerequisites for employment were minimal, entry 
training programs lasted only about two weeks and turnover among young 
workers was said to be very high. However, the textile industry provided 
the clearest examples of an internal labor market structure. Workers who
TABLE 7






Degree of Market 
Internalization
Walk-Ins, Word of mouth, 
Local media
No standard requirements 
for employment
No formal training programs 
were said to exist, Learn 
by watching someone perform­
ing the job
No formal job ladders, 
Upper level slots filled 





Appeared Preference for 
High school graduates
Informal O.J.T., watching 
someone, More formal 
demonstration classes, 
Vestibule and company 
training schools
In production lines, 
upper level slots were 
filled from within 
when possible
Turnover v Very high, High in some cases, low
Mostly quits in others, but not said
to be a serious problem, 




Referrals, Local media 




Entry level, formal, 
supervised training 
period, Beyond O.J.T. 
more informal, watching 
experienced workers
Internal labor markets 
well developed and func­
tion to allocate the 
internal division of 
labor, Clearly defined 
avenues of mobility 








stayed with the company had definite lines of upward progression open to 
them, i.e., pay increases and promotions. I would, therefore, tend to 
consider textile workers to be in the primary labor market. They were, 
to be sure, very low level primary workers, in that the jobs were routine, 
workers did not possess a great deal of autonomy over their jobs, and 
turnover resulted more in going to another similarly situated firm rather 
than advancement.
In the electronics firms, recruitment was somewhat more structured, 
upper level vacancies were filled from within and training programs were 
both formal and informal. Although specific wage information was not 
available, given that electronics is a rapid growth sector, one can sur­
mise that electronics workers, on the average, were better paid than either 
footwear or textile workers. The information presented herein, as well 
as my personal observations of the plants visited, leads me to conclude 
that occupations in the electronics industry belong in the primary labor 
market. Furthermore, workers who leave one electronics firm often go to 
another electronics company, but textile workers who quit may either move 
to a footwear company or stay within the textile industry. The same holds 
true for footwear workers. This suggests there may be a separate labor 
market for electronics workers, but a common labor market for shoe and 
textile workers in the Manchester area.
Analysis of the footwear industry entailed a problem not encountered 
in either of the other case studies. The information gathered during the 
interviews and the summary given in Chart 1 strongly suggest that jobs in 
the footwear industry should be considered secondary market employment. 
Recruitment procedures were quite unstructured, there were no formal training 
programs, no evidence of internal labor markets, and very high turnover rates.
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All of these are clearly secondary market employment conditions. However, 
one company that I visited was unionized. Although the presence of a 
union is usually considered to be a characteristic of primary market 
employment, in this case it was difficult to see whether or not the union 
resulted in more stable employment. In my judgment, employment conditions, 
in terms of attractiveness of the plant and workers' sense of job attachment, 
were somewhat better in the unionized than non-unionized plant. The latter
clearly belonged in the secondary labor market. I am in no position to
argue the union was responsible for the marginally better conditions. 
Regardless, occupations in the unionized firm can be considered very low
level primary, on a par with the textile workers'.
The basic problem involved in trying to fit the results of the case 
study into the dualist perspective was in reconciling a conceptual frame­
work for the study of labor markets with observed "real world" examples.
This problem was further exacerbated by the nature of the industries studied. 
Textiles, footwear, and, to a lesser extent, electronics are all basically 
low wage, competitive industries engaged in light manufacturing. These are 
obviously very different from the automobile or steel industries, which are 
high wage and have a long history of collective bargaining and internal 
organization. No high wage industries or occupations which are unequivocally 
primary were considered. Thus, I was trying to see evidence of occupational 
stratification within a narrowly defined segment of the labor market.
Clearly, some occupations exhibit both primary and secondary market 
characteristics. Jobs in the textile company were denoted by a developed 
internal labor market and the presence of a union, but were marked by a 
very high turnover rate. Footwear workers in a nonunionized plant were, 
according to established criteria, in the secondary sector while employees
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in a unionized shop were borderline primary. Employees and jobs in the 
electronics firms visited exhibited the most primary market characteristics 
of the three.
In my judgement, there was a qualitative difference in employment con­
ditions in the electronics companies as compared with the nonunionized 
shoe company. However, the others were marked by considerable overlap.
The important question is whether or not finding a "mixed bag" of primary 
and secondary employment conditions in some of the firms is inconsistent 
with the basic postulates of dual labor market theory. In the remainder 
of this chpater, I argue that this finding is not inconsistent with dual 
labor market theory.
Even from the outset, it was unrealistic to expect to find an exact 
one-to-one correspondence between the conceptual literature on the 
characteristics of primary and secondary market employment and "real world" 
situations. It was far more important to see if employment patterns in the 
industries studied conform to predictions of dual market theory.
The modes of employment which I have deemed secondary conform to the 
theory, in that hiring standards were informal and casual with minimal 
pre-employment questioning and screening. The employer's chief concern 
appeared to be simply getting enough people to show up for work. Training 
programs were unstructured, in that a new worker could be taught his/her 
job in a very short period of time. Advancement opportunities were limited. 
For the most part, employees remained in their initial employment assign­
ments, indicating the absence of an internal labor market. Turnover rates 
were very high. Workers appeared not to have much difficulty in moving 
about from one shoe or mill company to almost any other.
The above are all basic features of secondary market employment,
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which were found to characterize working conditions in the nonunionized 
footwear company studied.
Occupations which I have deemed primary were characterized somewhat 
by greater formality in the hiring process. References were often checked, 
and educational level was at least noted by prospective employers. For­
malized training rpograms, including vestibule schools, courses in assembly 
related skills, and O.J.T. were found to be operative. Many workers with 
whom I talked had advanced out of entry level positions and were moving up 
in an internal labor market. Although turnover rates fluctuated, management 
did not voice much concern about it being a serious problem.
The preceding are all established criteria for an employment situation 
to be considered in the primary labor market. They were also found to 
characterize employment in the Manchester electronics industry. As mentioned 
above, jobs in some of the firms exhibited aspects of both the primary and 
secondary labor markets, and as a result did not fall directly into either.
In the following paragraphs, I offer an explanation as to why there was 
considerable overlap.
Compared with other cities where research on labor market structure 
has been attempted, Manchester is considerably smaller in size and located 
in a more rural environment. Even though, in recent years, more industry 
has been locating in New Hampshire (electronics, computer circuitry, etc.) 
industry in Manchester has a long history of being dominated by the shoe 
and textile mills. Now in their declining stages, these industries, up 
until very recently, accounted for a substantial amount of total manufac­
turing employment in Manchester (see Table 6).
The domination of the mill work industries offers a partial explanation 
for the lack of an historical process of the segmentation of the Manchester
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labor market. It is quite difficult to see segmentation in a labor market 
that is not characterized by a diverse industrial and occupational struc­
ture. However, the recent influx of electronics firms appears to have 
contributed to segmentation of the Manchester labor market, since the mill 
and electronics companies did not seem to draw manpower from the same pool 
of workers.
Another reason for the difficulty in identifying secondary and primary 
labor markets may have been the absence of non-white workers. All of the 
workers I interviewed were white. In fact, I really cannot recall seeing 
any blacks in the plants I visited. Since dual labor market theory had 
its origins in explaining the plight of urban blacks segregated into ghetto 
labor markets, the study of a labor market without a sizable black popula­
tion confined to low wage jobs makes for a severe test of the dual labor 
hypothesis.
To summarize, I conclude that although the interviews suggest segmen­
tation in the Manchester labor market, it is by no means as clear as in the 
case of a large city where segments of the population are confined to cer­
tain types of jobs in inner city labor markets. Nevertheless, the employ­
ment patterns in the firms studies were not inconsistent with dual labor 
market theory. The line separating lower level primary from secondary was 
found to be a fine one, but when dealing with an emerging stratified 
labor process, it would have been impractical to expect clear-cut market 
segments, each with their own market specific characteristics.
In the concluding chapter, I present a review of the more important 
findings derived from the empirical models and the case study. I also tie 
the two together, in order to show the extent to which the results of the 
case study substantiate those of the econometric models.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
In the preceding chapters, the incidence of segmentation in New 
England labor markets has been examined by means of empirical models 
and a case study. The empirical sections included three econometric 
models, using data from the 1970 Census Public Use Sample in an attempt 
to identify factors which influence the process of wage determination in 
primary and secondary labor markets, the likelihood of employment in the 
primary market, and the chances for upward mobility. The case study 
entailed an indepth look at employment conditions and industrial organi­
zation in three of Manchester, New Hampshire's largest manufacturing 
industries. In this final chapter, I present a summary of my major 
findings, weaving together the results of the empirical models and the 
case study. The chapter concludes with some notes for further research 
on segmented labor markets.
Major Findings
Education did not appear to be a significant factor in the alloca­
tion of jobs in low wage, secondary labor markets. The results of 
Model 1 indicate that graduation status had no systematic effect on 
earnings for secondary market workers. Secondary employers thus displayed 
no preference for high school graduates in their hiring and remuneration 
schemas. This was expected, given the low skill level of most secondary 
employment situations.
This result was substantiated in the Manchester case study. None of 
the low wage industries surveyed had any education prerequisites for
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employment. For example, although most of the footwear workers did not 
finish high school, those that did worked at the same type of job as 
those without the diploma. Educational levels were said not to influence 
productivity, and therefore had no impact on wages and earnings. This 
finding is similar to the results of two case studies of low wage Southern 
textile plants wherein "the education of high producers did not differ 
from that of low producers" and productivity and education were, in some 
cases, inversely related.'*'
In the primary labor market, earnings and education were positively 
related and completion of high school significantly increased a worker's 
chances of securing a primary market occupation. The coefficients of the 
earnings and probability of primary employment models indicated that the 
better paying jobs within the primary market are reserved for high school 
graduates, and that the "diploma effect" remains a strong entrance require­
ment to many primary market positions. In the Manchester electronics 
industry, the highest wage industry of those studied, employers seemed to 
prefer high school graduates, although they said they did not screen out 
nongraduates. Their preference for graduates was clearly demonstrated, in 
that all of those who exhibited upward mobility, i.e., moved out of entry 
level positions, were at least high school graduates. Thus promotion and 
pay increases were dependent upon educational levels.
Even though more research is needed on the relationship between 
education and income in different strata of the labor market, the results 
presented here suggest that education "pays off" only in the primary 
labor market. Increasing educational levels of workers confined to secon­
dary labor markets will not necessarily lead to higher incomes. Accordingly,
"*Tvar Berg, Education and Jobs: The Great Training Robbery (Boston:
Beacon Press, 1971), pp.87-88.
the "supply" approach to alleviating inequalities in the labor market by 
increasing the human capital of disadvantaged workers is called into 
question. However, for workers who gain access to the primary labor 
market, education serves its traditional function as a means of genera­
ting higher incomes and promotional opportunities.
Years in the labor force exerted a positive effect on earnings in 
the primary labor market, but were not correlated with earnings in the 
secondary sector. Furthermore, the longer a person resided in the 
secondary market, the less likely were his chances of moving into the 
primary sector. The empirical results suggest that occupational stability 
is encouraged in primary jobs, in that financial returns accrue to workers 
who remain in and move up the ranks of an internal labor market. The 
internal labor market found to be operative in a Manchester textile com­
pany had clearly defined mechanisms governing pay increases attributable 
to promotions and seniority. In general, those workers employed in firms 
having internal market structures received pay increases and/or promotions 
as specified in union contracts or in institutionally determined proce- 
dues. The internal market clearly appeared to promote organizational 
stability by providing employees (and management) with some degree of 
protection from external market forces.
The finding that experience did not lead to higher incomes in secon­
dary jobs can be attributed to the nature of employment therein. The jobs 
have short learning curves and productivity quickly reaches a plateau. 
Dualists further argue that employment relations are casual, and there is 
little incentive on the part of either management or labor to develop a 
stable work environment. The case study only partly substantiated these 
contentions. The jobs which I considered secondary were ones which 
required minimal skill levels. Turnover in the firms in which they were
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located was in excess of 100 percent. Nonetheless, even in the firms 
without a developed internal labor market, workers with seniority received 
higher wages than new employees, even if they were performing the same 
basic tasks.
With respect to the model testing the probability of upward mobility, 
only participation in a vocational training program was found to increase 
the likelihood of movement from the secondary to primary labor market.
This was the only human capital variable which proved significant in 
explaining mobility. Neither education nor experience increased a worker's 
chances of upward mobility.
That the model failed to account for the extent of intersectoral
mobility over this time period was apparent, upon inspection of the data
which revealed a substantial number of respondents whose 1965 occupation
was in the secondary sector, but whose 1970 occupation was in the primary
market. Despite the fact that this was a period of rapid G.N.P. growth
and falling rates of unemployment (tightening labor markets), the extent
of the mobility suggests that barriers between labor markets are not
2 3impenetrable. Similar conclusions were reached by Andrisani and Rosenberg 
who both concluded that secondary to primary mobility occurs to an extent 
irreconcilable with a strict interpretation of dual labor market theory.
Although many dualists have been quite skeptical of expansionary 
macro policy as a means to curb high levels of unemployment in the secon­
dary labor market, the results obtained here suggest high levels of aggre­
gate demand do have an impact on secondary to primary mobility, and on
2
Paul James Andrisani, "An Empirical Analysis of the Dual Labor 
Market Theory" (Ph.D. dissertation, Ohio State University, 1973), p.86.
3
Samuel Rosenberg, "The Dual Labor Market: Its Existence and Con­
sequences" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley,
1975), p.170.
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lowering unemployment rates. More research is definitely needed on the 
responsiveness of employment in low wage sectors of the economy to 
fluctuations in aggregate demand. However, I feel safe to conclude that 
sustained high levels of aggregate demand are at least a prerequisite 
to significant policy proposals aimed at the transformation of secondary 
labor markets.
The results of the case study indicate there is a considerable 
amount of intergenerational transmission of low wage labor power in the 
Manchester area. Many of the interviewees in the shoe and textile com­
panies told me that their fathers also worked in the mills in Manchester. 
Although the offspring may have marginally higher levels of education than 
their parents, there did not appear to be any important returns to 
increased education, in terms of movement out of these low wage industrial 
sectors. Perhaps this suggests the need for at least a high school 
diploma in order to gain access to better paying employment. One should 
not be too quick to cite this reproduction of low wage labor power as 
evidence supportive of the culture of poverty thesis discussed in Chapter
2. I tend to consider it endemic to the structure of industry in Manchester, 
a city with a long history of being a "mill town". Nevertheless, further 
research is needed on the life cycle experience of workers trapped in 
secondary labor markets.
What overall conclusions can be drawn from the above findings?
While I feel that my results point to segmentation in New England
labor markets, the extent of secondary to primary mobility leads me to
stand in basic agreement with Doeringer and Piore's conclusion that:
The data currently available do not uniquely 
support either a continuous (queue) or a dicho- 
tomous (dual) theory of the labor market. Never­
theless it would seem that a unified labor market 
with linkages between primary and secondary
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employment is most likely to characterize the 
labor market behavior of the disadvantaged who 
are white.^
Notes for Further Research 
Substantive Issues
The results of the models and the case study clearly point to 
areas where additional research is warranted. In this concluding section,
I point out several of these areas and make suggestions concerning the 
nature of this research.
1. Additional research is needed on the responsiveness of 
employment in low wage sectors of the economy to fluctuations in aggregate 
demand. The Census data only provided employment information during an 
expansionary phase of the business cycle. Therefore, it was not possible 
to determine whether or not those workers who were upwardly mobile during 
the upswing found themselves either unemployed or back in the secondary 
market once the downswing of the early to mid 1970's set in. A possible 
research strategy might entail extensive interviews with older workers
in low wage employment situations who have experienced numerous oscillations 
in aggregate demand.
2. The results of the case study indicate the need for further 
research on the life cycle experience of low wage laborers. Many of the 
workers I interviewed had been with the same company upwards of twenty 
years, yet turnover in these firms was reported to be in excess of 100 
percent per year. Different employment patterns among different age 
cohorts even within the same industry should be explored, especially since 
proponents of dual theory advocate policies aimed at stabilizing secondary 
market employment relationships.
4
Peter B. Doeringer and Michael J. Piore, Internal Labor Markets and 
Manpower Analysis (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Company, 1971), p.183.
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3. The role and influence of labor unions in low wage firms and 
industries is an area in which surprisingly little research has been 
attempted. Although union influence is not as strong in competitive 
industries as in oligopolies, it is important to document the extent to 
which a union is able to qualitatively improve the work environment in a 
low wage, competitive firm. It is important to shed some light on this 
issue in that if the presence of a union stabilizes and institutionalizes 
labor management relationships, unionization may become a means whereby 
secondary market jobs can begin to take on primary market characteristics.
4. Additional research should also be focused upon the labor 
market in rural and semi-urban geographic locales in order to test the 
generality of dual theory. The results of the Manchester study indicate 
that a diverse occupational and industrial structure is a necessary pre­
requisite to segmentation of a local labor market. Supplemental studies 
of the historical process of industrial development in small to mid­
sized cities would do much to augment our understanding of the workings 
of labor markets and market segmentation.
Methodological Issue
The empirical models contained herein, as well as in other 
related studies, provide researchers with useful information on labor 
market behavior. Accusations of truncation aside, it is obviously impor­
tant to find that education, vocational training, experience, etc. are 
not correlated with earnings in the secondary labor market. Likewise, 
the Census data provide information enabling us to construct models 
to examine the importance of labor market status five years earlier as a 
determinant of current labor market status and, in general, to test the 
significance that human capital variables have on labor market standing.
118
I believe there is an important methodological problem with these 
types of models that persons working from a dualist perspective need to 
address. The problem lies in my belief that these models are more geared 
to exposing weaknesses in the traditional queue theory approach to the 
study of labor market behavior than in demonstrating the viability of the 
dualist approach. The reason for this one-sidedness rests, in part, with 
the nature of the data sources currently at our disposal. Most large 
scale government or government-sponsored surveys collect data on what may 
properly be considered supply side variables: education levels, partici­
pation in vocational training programs, marital status, head of household, 
etc. What is missing are detailed characteristics of employment condi­
tions and industrial structure, i.e., demand side factors to go along with 
the supply side variables currently b,eing tabulated.
As shown in the previous chapter, in trying to determine if a parti­
cular job is primary or secondary, it is important to know characteristics 
of the firm as well as the industry in which the job is located. In the 
footwear industry, for example, the presence of a union in one firm was 
a reason why employment therein was considered primary, while a nonunion 
firm was clearly secondary. Furthermore, occupations in firms which are 
subsidiaries of larger companies or larger than their competitors may be 
primary, while the same occupation in a smaller independent organization 
may be secondary. Thus, the size and relative autonomy of firms in an 
industry are important factors in determining the labor market status of 
employment therein. This is especially true in light of the work of 
Katherine Stone, which points out that the extent of market internaliza­
tion (the most important factor in determining primary/secondary status) 
is directly related to the size of the organization.^
"’Katherine Stone, "The Origins of Job Structures in the Steel Industry" 
in Labor Market Segmentation, ed. Richard C. Edwards, et.al.(Lexington, Mass 
D. C. Heath and Company, 1975), pp.27-84.
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The above is not meant to deny either the importance or the viability 
of econometric models presented by proponents of dual labor market theory.
It is quite legitimate to expose weaknesses in the mainstream paradigm in 
order to signify the need for alternative approaches. However, it is my 
feeling that labor market segmentation theorists planning empirical studies 
should place less emphasis on data bases constructed primarily for neo­
classical analysis. The case study is one approach which is particularly 
constructive for generating data for the study of local labor markets.
The interview format developed in this dissertation enables the researcher 
to have direct contact with workers for supply side and background data, 
and with management for industrial organization and labor demand information. 
I conclude that both are essential for a thorough study of the labor pro­
cess, and believe that this dissertation provides an important contribution 
to the development of a framework for labor market analysis which incor­
porates demand side as well as cu^ply side factors. It is my hope that 
this study encourages other dualists to work on the construction of a data 
base comprehensive enough to take account of individual and institutional 
compenents of the labor market.
APPENDIX 1
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VocT 0.132 0.117 1.000
Marital 0.013 0.011 0.009 1.000
Class 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.114 1.000
HSG 0.189 0.183 0.147 0.025 -0.099
El 0.048 0.057 -0.021 -0.031 -0.037
E2 0.027 0.019 0.040 0.029 0.044





















Upward Mobility Model 














0.019 -0.069 -0.221 1.000
-0.076 -0.244 -0.254 -0.423 1.000
0.079 0.127 0.056 0.094 -0.057 1.000




Sample Copies of Questionnaires 
Used in the Case Study
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I. Recruitment and Screening
1. Where do most of your workers live?
2. From what sources do you do most of your hiring?
3. Who is your major competition for workers?
4. What do you look for when you hire workers?
(Probe: education, experience, age, sex....)
II. Training
1. Are provisions made for in house worker training?
2. Who is usually given responsibility for providing worker 
training? (Probe for degree of formality)
III. Worker Mobility
1. Are most of your workers hired into entry level positions?
2. Are there opportunities for workers who begin their employ­
ment in entry level positions to move up through the ranks?
3. What are some of the factors which determine which workers 
receive promotions?
4. Can you give me an example of a line of progression or job
ladder which operates in this organization?
5. When vacancies occur in upper level job slots, are they 
normally filled by upgrading or transferring workers from 
within the organization?
5a. If not, how are they filled?
IV. Turnover
1. Can you tell me the turnover rate in this organization?
2. Do you feel labor turnover to be a serious problem?
3. When you lose workers, where do they go?






1. What Is your present position with this organization?
2. Can you give me a brief description of your work related responsibilities
3. How long have you been working as a (response to 1)?
________________________ yrs. ___________________________ mos.
4. How long have you been employed with (name of organization)?
________________________ yrs. ___________________________ mos.
If 4 is different from 3, ask 5 and 6; otherwise skip to 7.
5. What was your position with this organization when you were first
hired? _____________________________________________________
6. What positions have you held between your initial placement and your 
current position?
7. Are you presently a member of a labor union?________ yes  no
Please specify union name:____________________________________
8. Between the time you were first hired and now, have you received
periodic: (a) Pay Increases  yes  no
(b) Paid Vacation Time  yes  no
(c) Other Fringe Benefits   yes   no
9. Since you started working for (name of organization) have you 
undertaken any formal or informal on the job training?
  yes   no
If yes, ask 9a and 9b, otherwise skip to 10.
9a. Please indicate the nature of this training?
9b. Has this training led to: pay increases _______  yes  no
promotions  yes  no
10. Five years from now do you see yourself still working for (name
of organization?  yes  no
In what capacity? ___________________________________________
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What do you foresee yourself doing?____________________________





12. Are you currently holding down a second job?
yes i no
What type of work is your second job?_________________
13. What aspects of your current job do you like the best?
14. What aspects of your current job do you like the least?
15. Which of the following would best describe the relationship between 
you and your coworkers and your immediate supervisor?
  Constant supervision
  Supervisor "checking" regularly (every hour)
  Left along most of the day
  Other, specify __________________________
16. What do you like about your current job compared with jobs you've
had in the past?  better pay
_________  better hours
_________  better working conditions
_________  closer to home
_________  other, specify_________________
17. Suppose a new firm were to locate in this area and offer you a job 
similar to the one you now have. What would it take to persuade
you to swith jobs? _____ more money, how much _____
  better conditions, such as _________
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18. What is the highest level of schooling you have completed?
  No High School
  Some High School
  Some College
  College Graduate
19. After you finished school did you take any formal vocational
training courses?_______________________ ____  yes _____ no
If 19 yes, ask 20; if no skip to 21.
20. What kind of training program did you take?
21. What was your first regular job after you finished school (and 
traning program)?
22. Do you feel your current job requires the educational background 
you have? ____  yes  no
23. Are you married? ____  yes  no
If 23 is yes, ask 24; if no skip to 25.
24. Does your wife, husband work? ____ yes  no
What type of work does he, she do? __________________________
25. When you were growing up, say in your early teens, what kind of work 
did your father do?
26. How much formal schooling did your father have?
  No High School
  Some High School
  High School Graduate
  Some College
  College Graduate
27. Did you grow up in the State of New Hampshire?  yes  no
If no, ask: In what state (or part of the country) did you live
while you were growing up? ___________________________________
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